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THE CLOSING OF THE ETHER:
COMMUNICATION POLICY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES
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SETH ASHLEY*

How do media systems come to be structured in different ways? Through a
comparative historical institutional analysis of the origins of broadcasting policy
in the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth century, this study
examines reasons that private, commercial interests dominated the U.S. system
while Britain granted a monopoly to the publicly funded, noncommercial BBC.
Policy outcomes at this critical juncture were contingent on different pathdependent notions of the public interest as well as temporal sequencing. Through
an analysis of primary documents and secondary literature, this study considers
the implications of these different approaches for modern communication policy
and democratic society.

Critical discussions of the structure and function of media systems often
center on the notion that there is nothing inherently natural about the way media
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The Closing of the Ether 1
systems develop over time.1 Rather, media systems evolve due to deliberate and
accidental policies and practices that exist within social and political contexts.
Once certain paths are selected, policy outcomes can have lasting effects. But
how does this process unfold, and what factors lead to different outcomes?
Following previous research that has identified the origins of broadcast
media as a major critical juncture in the history of communication,2 this study
presents a comparative historical institutional analysis of the origins of
broadcasting policy in the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth
century. Although the countries are fundamentally similar, they took notably
different approaches to structuring and regulating broadcast media. In the
United States, private, commercial media were fully institutionalized in the
1930s, while in Britain, the noncommercial, publicly funded BBC held a
monopoly. How could two similar nations, sharing the same ostensible concern
1

See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (1989);

DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND
POLITICS 2 (2004); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA: U.S. COMMUNICATION
POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 18 (2004); PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 1-2 (2004).
2

See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATION, MASS MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE

BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993); SUSAN SMULYAN, SELLING
RADIO: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1920-1934 (1994); THOMAS
STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1996).
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for the public interest, produce such drastically different outcomes? How did
different conceptions of the public interest shape these early broadcasting policy
outcomes? Through an analysis of primary sources and secondary literature, this
study examines the origins of broadcast policy in the 1920s, from the emergence
of broadcasting as a popular medium in 1921 up to the institutionalization of
modern policy structures in 1927, in an attempt to better understand how today’s
media landscape came to be and to consider how media systems can be best
equipped to enhance democratic practices.
The goals of the study are to synthesize existing literature, uncover
additional primary source detail to supplement the rich body of work that
already exists, and make a useful case comparison that helps illustrate and
explain divergent policy outcomes. This historical analysis will show that
although both systems represent a top-down process of closing the ether to new
entrants as power was concentrated, the outcomes exemplified and hinged on
two radically different conceptions of the role of the state in regulating media.
Where the American design was dominated by capitalist concerns for profit and
growth, the British outcome was better able to preserve democratic impulses.
The public-interest concept that guided the American outcome was embedded in
a market orientation and gave preference to industry and economic concerns,
while the British outcome was motivated by paternalistic notions of public
service, which treated broadcasting more like a utility designed to bring quality
content to citizens. Notably, both countries avoided the more extreme options: a
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free-market property rights solution on one hand and a total government
takeover on the other. Both systems have seen changes since their origins, but
these early designs still resonate strongly today.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
All the modern social sciences – and especially sociology – were originally
a response to the effects of the industrialization and commercialization of society
in the nineteenth century.3 Through a range of methods, scholars have attempted
to understand and provide explanations for the drastic changes that took place
during this time. Historical sociology is one of the earliest and most enduring
forms of knowledge production, as it allows scholars to focus their attention on
big questions about the nature of society, social processes, and social institutions
over time. Some of the most significant scholarly works of the past century
employ this method as they examine a range of topics including the rise of the
welfare state, class formation, economic development, social revolutions and
political organization.4 Studies in this tradition can be broadly interpretive or
causal and analytical and can seek to make modest empirical claims and
generalizations. These studies typically rely on a small number of cases, which
allows for the kind of deep, contextualized analysis that is often lacking and
3

See Theda Skocpol, Sociology’s Historical Imagination, in VISION AND METHOD IN

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 1-21, (Theda Skocpol, ed., 1984).
4

For an overview of major works, see chapters 2 through 10 in SKOCPOL, id.
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indeed often impossible in quantitative research, especially that which relies on
cross-national comparisons based on statistical analyses.5
Based on this sociological approach, this article combines historical
comparison with institutional analysis. The case comparison seeks to “explore
alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas and
evidence,”6 and the institutionalist approach examines relationships between
state and society to see how patterns of behavior become structured and carried
out by individuals and groups.7 As Theda Skocpol notes, “[B]ringing the state
and state-society relationships to the fore in the definition of important,
substantive problems for research, and in the search for explanatory
hypotheses,” has helped to identify “the interconnections of institutions and
organizations that other scholars tended to treat separately from one another.”8
Within this institutionalist context, an emphasis on path dependency highlights
5

See, e.g., SKOCPOL, supra note 4; JAMES MAHONEY & DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER,

COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2003).
6

CHARLES C. RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD: MOVING BEYOND QUALITATIVE AND

QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES viii (1987).
7

See, e.g., CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES AND HUGE COMPARISONS

(1984); Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, in
STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1-32 (Sven
Steinmo ed., 1992); Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 936 (1996).
8

Theda Skocpol, Why I am a Historical-Institutionalist, 28 POLITY 103, 103 (Fall 1995).
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the temporal element of processes that often exhibit considerable stability until
times of change, when decisions are made, paths are selected and alternatives are
pushed aside. The goal is to formulate explanations for the development of state
and social structures that reflect the instability of human relations and the fluid
nature of socially constructed norms.
Thus, this study looks to the past to identify and examine the “critical
junctures” or “switch-points” that led to certain communication policy
outcomes.9 The path-dependent nature of media systems means that the
outcomes produced at these critical junctures have a significant impact on a
system’s future.10 In the origins of broadcasting, we can see taking shape
different modern conceptions of public and private, of individual and society,
and of the proper role of the state. Today, similar policy debates surround
regulation of the Internet and other digital technologies as we find ourselves in
another critical juncture in communication history.

9

See Giovanni Capoccia & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory,

Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, 59 WORLD POLITICS 341 (2007); Kathleen
Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
369 (1999).
10

On path dependence, see PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS AND

SOCIAL ANALYSIS (2004); James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY &
SOCIETY 507 (2000); W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY (1994).
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This study also takes cues from critical and cultural studies in
communication policy research, and follows the approach described by Willard
D. Rowland Jr.11 Studies of communication and telecommunication policy and
history often rely on “formalistic legal analysis of the relevant laws,
administrative agency decisions, and judicial rulings with an emphasis on
questions of constitutionality, process or precedence.”12 This study, like
Rowland’s, views policy debates and documents “as social and political texts
subject to quite different readings, as socially created documents subject to
interpretation in much the same way as are literary and other cultural texts.”13
The historical comparative analysis of broadcasting origins presented here
broadens Rowland’s approach to include American and British life and, thus,
centers on the state as the unit of analysis with attention to the legal codification
of the public interest relevant to broadcasting policy and the institutional context
for that development. Ultimately, this research aims to address a central
question: How did different cultural conceptions of the “public interest” shape
early broadcasting policy outcomes in the United States and Great Britain?
For this project, the collection of data was an iterative process between
primary and secondary sources. There was also heavy reliance on secondary
11

Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Meaning of ‘The Public Interest’ in Communications Policy,

Part I: Its Origins in State and Federal Regulation, 2 COMM. L. & POL’Y 309 (1997).
12

Id. at 313.

13

Id.
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sources in constructing a narrative surrounding the time period analyzed,
perhaps more heavily than some historians would tolerate, but this is part of
what makes the historical comparative approach possible. A large amount of
data is needed to attempt to forge a comprehensive narrative and an adequate
explanation for questions such as the ones at hand. For this reason, it is common
for works of historical sociology to lean heavily on previous research in
synthesizing explanations. As Skocpol argues:

[A] dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every
investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparativehistorical research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research—and if
excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion—
secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a
given study.14

To be sure, this comparison of broadcasting origins is a big topic, and excellent
studies by specialists are indeed available in profusion. I am fortunate to be able
to make use of those works in the analysis that follows.

SELECTION OF CASES

14

Theda Skocpol, Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies, in SKOCPOL, supra note 3, 382.
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Why does Great Britain provide a good comparison in understanding and
explaining U.S. communication policy? What sort of comparative leverage is
gained through this approach? For a successful comparative analysis, it is
important to have an appropriate mix of similarities and differences. If cases are
too similar or too different, comparative analysis can be ineffective in generating
useful evidence and explanation.15 The British and American media systems are
appropriate for comparative analysis due to an attractive blend of similarities
and differences in both modern and historical incarnations. Other scholars have
tended to agree, as historical analyses of one system often rely on comparisons
with the other.16
Broadly, in their modern contexts, the British and American media
systems are often considered quite similar when compared to those of the rest of
the world. Both systems enjoy relatively similar press freedom and legal
restrictions, and both systems exist within relatively similar market economies.17
As such, both systems fall within Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini’s
conceptualization of the “North Atlantic or Liberal” media system model, which
contrasts with the “Polarized Pluralist Model” of the Mediterranean region and
the “Democratic Corporatist Model” of north and central Europe. “The Liberal
15

See MAHONEY & RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 5.

16

See, e.g., ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1966); ASA

BRIGGS, THE HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1961).
17

See HALLIN & MANCINI, supra note 1.
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Model is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of
commercial media” even though there is “considerable variation among
countries” grouped together.18 In one of the central differences, public
broadcasting in general receives a much larger audience share in the United
Kingdom, where the organizational and institutional structure of the BBC and its
long history helps to set the British media system apart.
Hallin and Mancini describe the British model for the regulation of
broadcasting as the “professional model,” in which “a strong tradition developed
that broadcasting should be largely insulated from political control and run by
broadcasting professionals.”19 Other broadcasting systems that exemplify this
model include the Canadian Broadcasting Company, Irish public broadcasting,
and some Scandinavian countries. Hallin and Mancini suggest that public
broadcasting in the United States also fits within this model, but it is a much
smaller part of the overall American media system as compared to the BBC in
Britain. Of course, both media systems have experienced change over time.
National public broadcasting did not exist in the United States until the 1960s,
just as the British media landscape began to change in the 1950s with the
introduction of commercial broadcasting and the Independent Television
Authority, created by the Television Act of 1954.20 Today, both countries can be
18

Id. at 11.

19

Id. at 31.

20

TELEVISION ACT OF 1954, 2 & 3 ELIZ. 2, C. 55.
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characterized as mixed systems, although the American system remains much
less mixed than the British.
In their historical contexts, the two countries share a common cultural
heritage under the British crown, but the American Revolution also represents a
significant departure from this heritage.21 The timeline is not the same, but both
countries experienced relatively similar processes of democratization, and both
countries experienced the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, first in
Britain then later in America, eventually giving rise to working and middle
classes as well as similar social structures.22 Culturally, the late nineteenth
century saw the growth of similar protectionist movements in both countries, as
evidenced by Victorian ideals of service in Britain and Progressive Era reforms in
the United States.23 And the long tradition of British paternalism, originating
during the Tudor and Stuart eras, actually has a kind of analogue in American
republicanism as espoused by such thinkers as Walter Lippmann.24 Politically,
British parliamentary democracy is not the same as American republican
democracy, but in that they are both Western, industrialized democracies, they

21

See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11-92 (1992).

22

See PHILIP NORTON, THE BRITISH POLITY (2nd ed. 1991); E. P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF

THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
23

(1964).

See PADDY SCANNELL & DAVID CARDIFF, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH BROADCASTING 9

(1991). See also LEWIS L. GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1914 (2001).
24

WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922).
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are appropriate for comparative analysis. With regard to media and
communications, the two countries are historically similar in that they both
developed similar publishing and telecommunication industries and experienced
similar levels of press freedom. Generally, the United States and Great Britain
and their respective media systems have an appropriate blend of similarities and
differences in both their modern and historical contexts to make them well suited
to comparative analysis.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH: SERVING THE MARKET
Much has been written about the history of both American and British
broadcasting.25 Before Erik Barnouw’s work in the 1960s, U.S. broadcasting
histories often focused on the triumphs of industry and technology.26 Barnouw
introduced the idea that the American commercial broadcasting system had
“never been formally adopted.”27 This line of inquiry has since been pursued by
a number of other scholars seeking to revise previously unquestioned accounts
and incorporate critical analysis. Philip T. Rosen paid attention to the early
battles over control for wireless technology that took place between the Navy,
the Post Office and the Department of Commerce, and considered alternative

25

See, e.g., BARNOUW, supra note 16; BRIGGS, supra note 16.

26

See, e.g., GLEASON L. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 (1938).

27

BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 281.
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types of broadcast systems that were clearly available as radio evolved.28 The late
1980s and 1990s brought a flurry of broadcasting histories, including Susan
Douglas’s important study of the period from 1899-1922, which brought to light
the conflicting visions for broadcasting propagated in the press by inventors,
amateurs and businessmen, who competed to have their visions dominate the
popular imagination.29 Douglas concluded that this period is when the real
debates over the structure of American broadcasting were settled, years before
the first Radio Act was written into law.30
Thomas Streeter agreed with this assessment and built on the story by
placing broadcasting in the context of corporate liberalism and clarifying the
contradictions inherent in broadcast policy.31 He wrote:

The effort to create a free open marketplace has produced an institution
that is dependent on government privileges and other forms of collective
constraints. Although constructed in the name of the classical ideals of
private property and the free marketplace, American commercial

28

PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT, 1920-1934 (1980).
29

SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899-1922 (1987).

30

Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).

31

STREETER, supra note 2.
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broadcasting, under close inspection, calls the coherence of those ideals
into question.32

Susan Smulyan concentrated on the rise of commercialism from 1920 to 1934,33
and Hugh Slotten argued that broadcasting had been viewed as a technical
problem to be managed efficiently by the regulation of structure, not content or
ownership.34 Slotten wrote: “Individuals were probably for the most part
unaware that by applying technocratic principles to policy making about radio
and television standards, especially by attempting to reduce issues to narrow
technical facts, they were indirectly supporting corporate liberal principles.”35
Another major contribution came in the form of Robert W. McChesney’s analysis
of media reformers who, in the 1920s and 1930s, resisted the dominant approach
to broadcasting and advocated for educational and noncommercial stations.36
His focus on the period from 1928 to 1935 suggests that the debates over
structure were hardly settled until the commercial system was finally
institutionalized in the Communication Act of 1934.

32

Id. at xii-xiii.

33

Smulyan, supra note 2.

34

HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE

UNITED STATES, 1920-1960 (2000).
35

Id. at 237.

36

MCCHESNEY, supra note 2.
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Rowland’s article in the Journal of Communication Law and Policy is perhaps
most relevant here. Rowland describes the uses of the “public interest” standard
in other applications prior to the advent of broadcasting and concludes that the
standard always had a clear pro-industry meaning.37 When applied to
broadcasting, the standard was intended first and foremost to protect the
economic interests of private companies. The American approach to
broadcasting “drew on the notion of natural monopoly” but “ensured that
communication services would be commercial rather than governmental.”38 The
Communication Act of 1934 would ultimately go out of its way to separate mass
media and common carrier, where mass media would describe the private
commercial operations that would dominate the airwaves and common carrier
would be the classification for utility services such as the telephone that would
provide equal access to all citizens.39
Despite evidence that seems to indicate an easy victory for industry forces
in the battle to control radio, scholars have noted that it is actually remarkable
that the United States was alone in the world in creating a private broadcasting

37

Rowland, supra note 11, at 328.

38

PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATION POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 14 (1999).
39

This is the distinction between Title II and Title III, on which the current FCC’s ruling

on net neutrality hinges. The Internet remains classified as a mass medium rather than a common
carrier, suggesting a preference to industry interests over public service.
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industry; in many other nations, the state retained control of the broadcasting
system or created significant independent public broadcasting corporations.40
Yet since the origins of broadcasting, the intricacies of communications policy
have come as much from business strategies as from government.41 Even in the
early days of broadcasting, regulators were disinclined to regulate in order to
avoid accusations of government censorship.42 In sum, media policy-making in
the United States always has been an intensely political process with no
guaranteed winners or losers.

THE BRITISH APPROACH: “THE BRUTE FORCE OF MONOPOLY”
Scholarship surrounding the history of British broadcasting almost cannot
help but place itself in the context of American broadcasting, whether discussing
similarities or differences. For example, Asa Briggs pointed out the contrast in
the evolution of the two systems:
40

See Huseyin Leblebici, et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of

Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry, 36
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 333 (1991); Herman S. Hettinger & William A. Porter, Radio Regulation: A Case
Study in Basic Policy Conflicts, 221 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 122 (1942).
41

See Harold D. Lasswell, Communications Research and Public Policy, 36 PUB. OPINION Q.

301 (1972); Jan van Cuilenburg & Denis McQuail, Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: Toward a New
Communications Policy Paradigm, 18 EUR. J. OF COMM. 181 (2003).
42

Erik Barnouw, Historical Survey of Communications Breakthroughs, 34 PROCEEDINGS OF

THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI.

13, 16 (1982).
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Eventually the British and American broadcasting systems were to be so
completely different — one based on a concept of “public service,” the
other fully integrated into the business system — that in all controversies
about the place of radio in society they were to be taken as the two chief
contrasting types.43

However, this was only true in the later years of the evolution. Earlier, the two
systems were not so different. “In both countries there were the same pressures
and the same outspoken advocates of common ideas and comparable
institutions,”44 Briggs wrote. Ultimately, the outcome in Britain was quite
different.
John Reith led the British Broadcasting Company from its origins as a
heavily regulated private monopoly in 1922 through its shift to a public
corporation operating under royal charter in 1927. Until he stepped down in
1938, he was perhaps the lead proponent of or at least the best known advocate
for the preservation of a noncommercial system of broadcasting in Britain. In a
1949 Report of the British Broadcasting Committee, Reith articulated the manner
in which this preservation was accomplished:

43

BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 59.

44

Id.
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It was the brute force of monopoly that enabled the BBC to become what it
did, and to do what it did; that made it possible for a policy of moral
responsibility to be followed. If there is to be competition it will be of
cheapness not of goodness. The usual disadvantages and dangers of
monopoly do not apply to Broadcasting; it is in fact a potent incentive.45

The “brute force” employed by the leaders of the BBC was their solution to the
paradox of democracy, in which rational, informed policies and practices can be
difficult to come by when irrational, uninformed approaches to problems carry
just as much weight.
Reith sought to reconcile this dilemma, and his approach to democracy
that earned him and the BBC charges of elitism and paternalism:

There must be some principle of ethics or economics to justify equality of
electoral power to an intelligent, responsible, respectable citizen, a
producer by hand or brain, contributor in large or small measure to the
wellbeing and wealth of the State; and to another unintelligent,
irresponsible, a lifelong charge on the State.46

45

Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1949: Appendix H: Memoranda submitted to the

Committee 364 (Cmd. 8117) (quoted in BURTON PAULU, BRITISH BROADCASTING 18 (1956)).
46

JOHN C.W. REITH, INTO THE WIND 170 (1949).
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It is easy to see how Reith could be viewed as an elitist, but it is this approach
that governed the BBC at least until the introduction of commercial television in
Britain in 1955. Even after the emergence of competition and the Independent
Television Authority, the BBC continued and continues to lead as one of the
world’s foremost broadcasting institutions.
While it is tempting to think of Reith’s approach as more noble than that
of the American system, Burton Paulu suggests that it is important not to think of
either system as superior:

Both the critics and the admirers of the British system overlook one very
important fact: a broadcasting system grows out of its environment and
cannot be described or appraised apart from its national setting. Above
all, it cannot be judged on the basis of how it might function in another
country.47

Paulu suggests that the British system is unfathomable to Americans because of
the potential for government control. But this neglects the fact that government
control was not a totally foreign concept in the United States; in fact, it had long
been present in daily life in America in such forms as public schools, the Post
Office and the military. Further, government control of radio actually was a

47

PAULU, supra note 45, at 3-4.
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distinct possibility in the United States well into the 1920s.48 Paulu also points
out that even without government control of broadcasting, critics warn of
government influence in the American system just as much, if not more, than in
the British system.49
James Curran and Jean Seaton suggest that the development of British
broadcasting has been described in two ways.50 One view is that the emergence
of the BBC monopoly was the “personal achievement” of John Reith, who
embarked on a cultural mission and succeeded. The other view is that the
emergence of the monopoly was accidental, or at least was a mere bureaucratic
solution crafted by the Post Office to deal with what was viewed as a technical
problem.51 R. H. Coase sides with the latter view, pointing out that radio was
developed faster and with better results in the United States.52 More
experimentation took place in the United States because people were eager to sell
wireless receivers and set up commercial broadcasting services. The British Post
Office, which already controlled all wireless and telephone communication, was
not prepared to issue broadcasts and thus had no incentive to encourage
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experiments.53 Furthermore, based on the U.S. experience, British officials
thought a monopoly was necessary to avoid interference problems.54 Coase
acknowledges that there was a unique public service mission in the United
Kingdom but suggests that this is only part of the story. Paddy Scannell and
David Cardiff suggest that there is truth in all of these understandings and that
the public service mission came after the monopoly had been established for
technical purposes.55 “Public service was a concept grafted onto an initial
pragmatic set of arrangements between the Post Office and the British radio
industry to establish a broadcasting service that would create a market for radioreceiving apparatuses,”56 they write.
Other countries were guided by the alternative approaches in the United
States and Britain. Canada, for example, followed the United States at first,
allowing private, commercial stations, but then created a national public
broadcasting commission in 1932, which became the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation in 1936. Private stations remained, however, resulting in a hybrid
model of public and private broadcasters.57
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In Britain, public service broadcasting had a solid footing, benefited from
public support, and gained a complete monopoly over broadcasting from the
1920s until the 1950s. The BBC retained a commitment to public service even
after the introduction of commercial radio and television. Regulations made it
difficult for commercial broadcasters to dominate the market and established
standards requiring them to serve the public interest.58 “In short, commercial
principles were kept on a short leash and were not permitted to set the rules for
the entire system,”59 one scholar writes.
The success of the BBC in preserving national traditions and culture also
has invited harsh critiques from both the left and the right. Critics charge that
despite efforts to insulate the BBC from political influence, the institution
narrowly represents the interests of the dominant class. As one British scholar
has noted, “In actual fact the largeness and wealth of the BBC indicate precisely
its willingness to incline to the wishes of the powerful. If it posed the slightest
threat to the powerful it would be dismantled.”60 It is worth noting that a similar
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critique has been applied to American commercial media, in that news outlets
can be said to reflect the ideology of their capitalist owners.61
Scholars point out that, in Britain today, the long-established licensing fee
and the culture it perpetuates are the central reasons for the BBC’s ability to
produce what is often considered to be high-quality content.62 This paints a
portrait of a quite different media culture for Britain compared to what
originated in the United States and remains present today.

CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT I:
THE RISE OF THE MARKET ECONOMY AND STATE CAPITALISM
To understand the context in which broadcasting policy developed, it is
important to consider the rise of market economies in the nineteenth century,
which caused major transformations in society. The idea of the classic market
economy, with free trade in land, labor and capital, never actually came to be, as
described by Karl Polanyi, William M. Reddy and others.63 What did transpire,
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as Reddy suggests, was the rise of a “market culture,” or a set of incorrect
perceptions and misguided practices that were informed by the language and
ideas of classic market economics but were never reflected in reality.64 Regardless
of its level of adherence to the rules of capitalism, this market culture, in both the
United States and Europe, “sparked countermovements of protest, reform, and
public regulation, all attempting to control the unsettling effects of economic
upheaval.”65 This was especially true in Britain, which has been called the first
industrialized nation and the first to have an established working class, which
emerged around the mid-eighteenth century.66 The British Empire was growing
to cover a quarter of the planet, but the expectations for government were
beginning to change to reflect needs beyond those of the national defense. The
expansion of government was “attributable to the increasing demands and
expectations of the newly enfranchised working population. Government began
to conceive its duties as extending beyond those of maintaining law and order
and of defending the realm.”67 These new measures enacted in the nineteenth
century included efforts to improve working conditions and public health, and
were “within the capabilities of the government to provide. They did not create
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too great an economic burden; they were not themselves economic measures.” 68
Concern for public welfare began to grow in the mid-1800s and remained a
largely nonpolitical issue well into the twentieth century.69 Protective measures
were put into place by conservatives and liberals as the welfare state grew and
the British Empire shrank. Attention was increasingly paid to domestic needs,
especially during the interwar period. In this context, the British Parliament was
designed to facilitate cooperation during the political process and to
accommodate citizen input.70
This is also the context in which the paternalism of John Reith’s BBC likely
grew. Since the Tudors and Stuarts, who heavily regulated what industry and
commerce existed at the time,71 Britain has a long history of paternalism, the
effects of which can be seen well into the 1800s. Historically, this notion of
paternalism described the relationship of the aristocracy to the working class; it
was thought that the privileged members of society owed some duty to the lower
classes, which needed to be cared for both economically and culturally. This
paternalism manifested itself, in part, in the protectionist measures instituted in
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response to the Industrial Revolution. Polanyi’s “double movement” concept
describes the way in which British society was pulled in separate directions,
which he called expansionism and protectionism.72 As markets grew during the
Industrial Revolution, government sought to facilitate economic growth but to
keep the pace slow enough as to protect citizens from the negative effects of
emerging markets. Self-interest was restrained to some degree in order to serve
larger social aims. Philip Norton describes this pattern of British history:

The reforms of the nineteenth century were facilitated not only by an
empirical orientation to change but also by the paternalism of political
leaders. Noblesse oblige (privilege entails responsibility) is a foreign phrase
but it embodies a very British concept. Many of the country’s aristocratic
leaders believed that they had a duty to help improve the condition of the
working man.73

This was far less so in America, where the revolutionary, republican spirit
still filled society with a preference for individualism and independence over
state intervention. As Michael Schudson notes, the increasing “democratization
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of economic life” stressed economic gain “to the exclusion of social aims.”74 This
blurred distinctions of class in what Schudson calls “the egalitarian age,” a
period in the 1830s and 1840s that saw “the opening of opportunity to persons
regardless of birth or breeding.”75 The spread of public education during this
time brought with it a spreading of wealth and political power, and “economic
development was promoted and shared by many rather than by few.”76 Penny
papers contributed to the expansion of the market through increased advertising
thus enlarging the market for manufactured goods and by transforming the
newspaper into a consumable product for private home use, not just borrowed or
passed around in public.77 This all speaks to the rise of a market culture in the
early United States that was somewhat closer to classic market ideal than the
market culture in Europe. As Schudson writes, “It became more acceptable to
think of ‘self-interest’ as the mainspring of human behavior and, indeed, in the
theory of the market, as a motive to be admired, not distrusted.”78 Thus, it was
during this period and the decades that followed that notions of democracy and
personal freedom and equality became tied to economic self-interest. The
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capitalist pursuit of wealth was becoming synonymous with democracy itself.
The regulatory framework that made this shift possible has been described as
capitalist state theory, in which a structural bias resulting from the state’s interest
in economic growth leads to policies that prop up dominant capitalist actors.79 A
history of paternalism and protectionism meant that Britain was more able to
resist this approach, while the United States would embrace it.

CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT II: THE PRESS AND COMMERCIALIZATION
It was also in this context that the notion of press freedom formed in the
American colonies; the main threat to free speech was thought to be from
government, Paul Starr wrote:

Precisely because of the interest in strengthening republican institutions,
early American policy included strong positive commitments to
information and communications, not merely the “negative liberty” of
individual rights to free expression. While the Europeans taxed
publications, the United States subsidized the growth of independent
newspapers through cheap postal rates.80
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While the First Amendment expresses an essentially negative conception of
liberty based on broad libertarian ideals,81 press freedom in practice relied on the
positive commitments described by Starr. In the early- to mid-1800s, printers
were typically aligned with political organizations, and the content of their
publications was generally partisan and advocacy-oriented. This is not
surprising, as funding came from political organizations, but it also came from
government, which subsidized the early press through printing contracts and
other means.82
News began to see a shift in the mid-1800s as capitalism was born and the
press began to commercialize.83 Gerald Baldasty documents the American
“evolution of news as a commodity to be shaped and marketed with an eye for
profit”84 as a phenomenon that began in the nineteenth century as newspapers
shifted away from partisanship toward objectivity. While the partisan press was
heavily influenced by political interests, it is important to note that its main goal
was to provide information, advocate for causes, and support candidates for
81
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office. Newspapers did not operate for profit, and they stressed news and
politics over entertainment and gossip. Before the commercialization of news,
partisan newspapers were part of the political process and produced a range of
debate about contemporary issues. This began to change as publishers realized
they could make a profit by neutralizing content, reaching wider audiences, and
selling space to advertisers. It is in the period after the Civil War that advertising
began to take its modern form, shifting from dry, fact-based claims to a reliance
on slogans and images.85
Thus, the rise of the penny press brought with it a decline in interest in
and attention to politics and a rise in attention to business and the general
commercialization of society. “The rise of the penny press, as limited
geographically as those cheap and lively papers were, provided the basis for the
press as a servant of business rather than of politics,”86 Baldasty wrote. Rather
than advocating for political goals and participating in the political process, the
press shifted its focus to providing entertaining and sensational fare that would
attract large audiences, large circulations, and large revenues from advertisers.
Success was measured by “news gathering and scoops, by ever-growing
circulation, and by booming revenues. Public service was second to private
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gain.”87 Advertisers began to counsel newspapers on the type of content that
would be attractive to business. Successful papers would avoid politics,
especially criticism of government officials, would be “optimistic and happy
about the world” and “present the bright side of life,” and offer “something of
interest to everyone in the potential reading audience, but particularly to
women.”88 This shift also required increasing attention to demographics so that
news content could be designed to attract consumers who could purchase the
goods and services being advertised.89
So while the rise of advertising during the nineteenth century helped free
the commercial press from government and political parties, new structures and
limitations were put in place. Rather than being tied to political ideologies, the
press became tied to one dominant ideology of commercialism and market
values. Schudson describes this as a shift to “the culture of a democratic market
society, a culture which had no place for social or intellectual deference. This was
the groundwork on which a belief in facts and a distrust of the reality, or
objectivity, of ‘values’ could thrive.”90 The penny papers, from which modern
journalistic values were drawn, were guided by and helped to institutionalize the
emerging ideology of commercialism with its focus on economic growth. This
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shift laid the groundwork for the commercialization of broadcasting in the
coming century in the United States. In Britain, it is exactly this approach to
media content that John Reith and the BBC would later resist, electing to ignore
audience demands or at least balance them with content that reflected the high
culture of the British elites.
The commercialization of the American press in the mid-1800s would
have parallels in Britain, where these new pressures “introduced a new system of
press censorship more effective than anything that had gone before. Market
forces succeeded where legal repression had failed in establishing the press as an
instrument of social control.”91 The reaction was the emergence of a radical,
working class press that would thrive in the 1800s and then decline with the
increasing commercialization and industrialization of British life, the rise of the
middle class, and the lifting of stamp and paper taxes, or the “taxes on
knowledge.” The lifting of taxes was not meant as a gift to publishers or readers,
but rather as a shift away from state regulation to regulation by market forces.
“The parliamentary campaign for a free press was never inspired by a simple
libertarian commitment to diversity of expression,” scholars wrote. “All that had
changed was an increasing conviction that market forces were a more efficient
and morally preferable control system to that administered by the state.”92 In
Britain as in America, the commercialization of the press helped to create mass
91
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audiences and mass markets, in which the press and advertising soon became
dependent on each other.93
Thus, the shifts in press structure in the United States and Britain in the
nineteenth century show far more similarities than the structures chosen for any
of the electronic communication technologies that emerged later. These early
similarities emphasize the nature of broadcasting origins as a critical juncture,
where links in the chains of communication history were clearly broken as the
two countries diverged sharply from what had previously been similar social
contexts. At the same time, these early similarities helped define the paths
available to the actors who created broadcasting policy.

CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT III: THE POST OFFICE AND THE TELEGRAPH
The revolution brought by the wired electric telegraph in the 1840s cannot
be understated, as it separated communication from transportation for the first
time in human history, as James Carey noted.94 The new communication
technology quickly evolved in very different ways in the United States and
Europe.95 As Paul Starr notes:
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In Europe, the domestic telegraph, and later the telephone, came under
the control of the state and were often assimilated into the organization of
the postal system. In the United States, in contrast, both the telegraph and
the telephone were established as private enterprise and went through a
phase of intense competition before evolving into monopolies and
becoming subject to government regulation.96

These early outcomes related to regulatory control constituted new and different
understandings of the role of the state in regulating industry in general and
communication in particular. In terms of path dependence, the contested policy
decision in America created inertia and feedback through the removal of options
over time. It also helped to write the scripts that future policymakers would rely
on in promoting industry power over government control in communications.
Had the United States opted for a government buyout of the telegraph
companies as Britain did, American radio policy might have seen an entirely
different fate.
Thus, the birth of the telegraph represents a critical juncture of its own,
and it initiated path-dependent processes that would carry well into the
“The Great Monopoly”: Western Union and the American Telegraph, 1845-1893 (Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University 2008).
96

STARR, supra note 1, at 153-155.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether 34
twentieth century and affect the structure of broadcasting in both nations in the
1920s and 1930s.97 But these processes were affected by more than mere matters
of ownership and control. Broader economic, legal and cultural conditions
affected the development of the new technology. The regulatory environment in
the U.S. encouraged the development of industry and technology more than in
Britain, as Starr notes:

American law and policy, as well as other conditions, were more
favorable to telecommunications development and led to more rapid,
early deployment of the technologies. Indeed, Americans played more of a
pioneering role in developing both the telegraph and the telephone than
one might reasonably have expected from the country’s overall level of
industrial and scientific development in the mid-nineteenth century.98

The centralized nature of the economy in the early American republic, which
presupposed a government takeover of the telegraph, eventually came into
conflict with a “state-oriented political economy that encouraged competition
between rival telegraph network providers chartered as private corporations.”99
In spite of this competition in the race to develop the first telecommunications
97
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network, Western Union gained control of the telegraph industry in the 1840s,
and the Associated Press dominated wire service news. These monopolies
represented “a new form of centralized power” for which Americans “at first
had no institutional response.”100 Western Union was subject to more
government regulation than other business operations,101 but it still gave
preference to business correspondence over personal messages, and its collusion
with the Associated Press made it difficult for smaller, local wire services to exist.
This provided a sharp contrast to the telegraph service that was provided by the
British Post Office, which treated the technology as a public utility and a
nationalized monopoly. It was not until the late nineteenth century in America
that concerns about private monopoly power grew and regulation of industry
became acceptable. This would be evident with the trust-busting of presidents
Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) and William Howard Taft (1909-1913).
This is not to suggest that Americans did not debate the private monopoly
held by Western Union in the nineteenth century. Wolff characterizes the rise of
Western Union as America’s first national corporate monopoly as a “traumatic
transition” from the tradition of public ownership in the postal system.102 This
took place in spite of intense public, state and commercial opposition, and
100
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represented a shift away from traditional concerns for the public interest. As
early as 1845, The New York Herald had called for the federal government to
“undertake the arrangement,” suggesting that the “public interest” would be
“much more securely promoted” in the hands of government.103 Similarly, an
1868 article in The New York Times summarized a report advocating for uniting
the post office and the telegraph in the United States, as had been done in Britain
and much of Europe. The report by Massachusetts lawyer Gardiner G. Hubbard
described the situation in Europe and “gives evidence of the fact that where the
Government owns the telegraph and unites it with the Post Office the wants of
the public are far better supplied than where the lines are owned and operated
by individuals or companies.”104
By the 1880s, many Americans were hopeful for a government takeover of
the telegraph. As John notes, “In no other decade did so many journalists,
lawmakers, and telegraph users invest such high hopes in the establishment of a
government telegraph. And in no other decade did they come away more
disappointed.”105 The closest Congress came was with the Post Road and
Telegraph Act of 1866,106 which was designed to restrict Western Union and
made provisions for a possible Congressional buyout of existing telegraph
103
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corporations. The passage of the act and the nearly simultaneous nationalization
of the British telegraph spurred many calls for a government takeover in the
United States, such as one by Missouri Senator B. Gratz Brown. Contending that
competition was not working in the telegraph industry, Brown proposed that a
government telegraph would, like the postal service, better serve rural areas and
would break up the “collusive relationship” between the telegraph corporations
and the Associated Press.107 This takeover never happened, and political
economists in the late 1800s introduced the idea that the telegraph represented a
“natural monopoly,” an idea that could be used to justify private ownership by a
single company, but could also be used as a call for more effective federal
government control.108 This sort of debate foreshadows what was about to
become the central question surrounding the emergence of broadcasting.
The American tolerance of the Western Union monopoly contrasts sharply
with the British approach to the telegraph. While the British state eventually
relinquished direct control of the publishing industry, new communication
technologies did not share the same fate. The rise of the telegraph in the mid1800s led to the Telegraph Act of 1869,109 which gave the Post Office the
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exclusive right to transmit telegrams within the United Kingdom.110 Prior to the
act, several private telegraph companies operated in the United Kingdom,
including the Electric and International, the British and Irish Magnetic, and the
United Kingdom Telegraphy Company. Fixed prices were set in 1865, several
years before the transition to full public monopoly. (This transition from
regulation of private industry to total public ownership would later be mirrored
in the shift from the British Broadcasting Company to the British Broadcasting
Corporation in the 1920s.) In addition to inconsistent pricing, the public had also
complained about poor service, especially in rural areas. These complaints from
the public fueled the drive for nationalization in the public interest.111
Despite the complaints, even before the postmaster general was
empowered by Parliament to purchase the private holdings, the telegraph
service was a popular means of communication among ordinary citizens, as
compared to America’s Western Union, which mostly existed to serve business
communication needs. In 1868, the average Western Union toll was $1.05, about
two-thirds of what an American worker earned in a day.112 By 1870, the British
and American services each sent about ten million messages per year, but the
United States had twice the population of Britain. The British service transmitted
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thirty-three million messages in 1884-85 and fifty million messages in 18861887.113 Commercial and speculative messages provided 87% of the Western
Union’s revenue in 1887, according to a report from Western Union to the U.S.
Postmaster General. The report said only 2% of Americans used the telegraph
each year, and only 5% of the company’s revenue came from “family and social
messages.”114 According to Wolff, “To Western Union, the telegraph was first
and foremost an adjunct of commerce, and speed was more important than price.
As long as the principal customers of the telegraph were in businesses that
demanded high-volume, high-speed communication, Western Union’s network
was ‘best.’”115 This characterizes the opposite of what was expected from public
service utilities operating in the public interest. Reformers who opposed the
Western Union monopoly “envisioned a low-priced telegraph that would be
used by all Americans, and while many reformers claimed that such a system
would be at least break-even, some admitted that even at a loss it was a cost
worth bearing.”116
The British telegraph in the hands of the post office was never profitable,
partly due to management problems and partly due to competition from
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telephone and improved postal services.117 So neither the British nor the
American telegraph services were successful in the sense that neither was able to
serve a broad citizenry and remain profitable. But it certainly is clear where their
priorities lay. The American system served American business at a high cost and
a large profit; the British system served the public at a low cost even while
operating at a loss. And despite their shortcomings, both of these distinct
approaches to regulating communication technology would be repeated to some
degree by each respective country, first with the telephone and later with
broadcasting.
Especially in Britain, the early decision to maintain government control
over wired transmissions had a lasting effect. An 1880 court case established the
post office as the universal licenser of wired phone services,118 and a 1904 act
gave the Postmaster General control of wireless telegraphy and later all
telephony.119 Ultimately the post office became the licenser of “broadcast
wireless telephony” and the sole operator of broadcasting, as it began to compete
with its own licensees and established a near monopoly by taking over trunk
lines and refusing to extend local licenses until after 1911. Telephony remained a
public monopoly under the post office until 1984 when it was privatized as
117
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British Telecom. The United States, on the other hand, would allow its telephone
service to operate as a private, regulated near-monopoly, and would leave
broadcasting in the hands of industry, which by the turn of the century, was a
whole new force in society.120
In sum, Britain and the United States experienced relatively similar
processes of commercialization in their press structures in the nineteenth
century, setting the stage for divergent approaches to broadcasting. But the
divergent approaches are less surprising considering the path-dependent
processes initiated during the emergence of the first electronic communication
forms in the mid-1800s. Britain viewed competition in the telegraph industry as
problematic and chose to nationalize and improve the service, which was
popular among the public even before the government buyout of industry.
Despite widespread protests, the United States tolerated the Western Union
monopoly, preferring a veneer of regulatory control to any sort of government
takeover. In both countries, the debates over the regulation of telegraphy would
be echoed in the debates over broadcasting, as similar policy scripts would be
invoked by subsequent historical actors. The policy outcomes would also be
echoed, suggesting that causal chains were being laid even if the links would
later be broken, if only for a short time. And although the public interest may not
have been explicitly invoked in communication policymaking at this critical
120
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juncture, the different approaches to the telegraph likely influenced what
different meanings the public interest would take on when it was invoked later.

THE RADIO EXPLOSION IN AMERICA
At the start of the 1920s, the conditions of radio in the U.S. and Britain
were not so different. In the United States, the Navy was poised to retain control
over coastal operations following World War I, and the Department of
Commerce would issue licenses to amateurs and the handful of private stations
that requested them.121 In Britain, the post office retained control of the airwaves
and licensed a handful of radio manufacturers to make their own broadcasts.122
Demand was low, broadcast signals could not travel far, and the situation was
relatively stable. But advances in technology and in imagination had given birth
to the possibility of broadcasting as a form of mass communication, and radio
manufacturers were eager to see their new crystal set receivers in every
household. Stimulating this sort of mass demand required programming, and as
radio grew, there was no shortage of groups of people — from newspapers,
department stores and other businesses to universities, churches and political
groups — who wanted to make their voices heard.123 Spectrum scarcity — the
limited physical property of the airwaves — demanded some system of control,
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but the sudden boundless enthusiasm to hear and be heard challenged efforts to
regulate the new technology.
The wartime ban on amateurs receiving wireless signals was finally lifted
by the Navy on April 12, 1919, and the ban on transmitting was lifted September
26.124 The Department of Commerce licensed thousands of amateur operators in
1920 and 1921, but the amateurs, despite their advanced knowledge, were slow
to gain access to the new technologies that would allow them to send and receive
speech and music. They were also relegated to the amateur range of frequencies
so as not to interfere with the growing number of private businesses operating
their own licensed stations, such as department stores and newspapers. It is
tempting to describe these stations as “commercial,” and they were in the sense
that they were operated by private businesses, but there was no paid advertising
on the airwaves at this point. Rather, for a station run by a department store or
newspaper, for example, “the entire station was an advertisement.”125 “Toll”
advertiser-supported broadcasting, or “commercial” broadcasting in the modern
sense, would not come along until 1922, and it would be slow to catch on.
Nevertheless, as the struggle for the airwaves continued, the amateurs did not
always comply with warnings from the Department of Commerce to stay in their
range. But once the amateurs were back in the radio game, Westinghouse
124
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executives realized what they were missing out on. They had failed to
understand the true potential and meaning of radio. Westinghouse scrambled to
build a new transmitter at its plant in Pittsburgh and applying to the Department
of Commerce for a special license to launch a regular broadcasting service with
the goal of stimulating sales of receivers. The company received the call letters
KDKA, and on November 2, 1920, made what is usually considered the first
mass radio broadcast of significant strength as they read election returns over the
air.126
Over the next year, amateur operators started lining up to purchase the
radio sets made by hobbyists and sold by department stores, some of which
started their own radio departments. In 1921, Westinghouse aligned with
General Electric, RCA and AT&T to share a pool of patents and trademarks and
began manufacturing radio sets.127 GE and Westinghouse manufactured radio
sets and parts while RCA marketed and sold them, and AT&T handled
transmitter equipment. Towers went up all over the country; amateurs did
whatever they could to circumvent the four radio giants. These four companies
formed the radio trust that would come to dominate what can only be loosely
described as an “industry” over the next few years and receive licenses for the
preferred high-power bands of the spectrum. Despite the growth of the radio
trust, “the industry” was still a diverse mix of interests, including everyone from
126

ROSEN, supra note 28, at 7.

127

BARNOUW, supra note 16, at 61-74.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether 45
RCA to universities to churches to political groups. Amateurs and others also
inundated the Department of Commerce for private business licenses to
broadcast on the better, clearer frequencies. And although Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover had been granted the power to issue these licenses
under the 1912 Radio Act,128 he had no power to deny them. Under these
conditions, chaos was inevitable. Broadcasting presented a unique challenge in
America, in that it “did not lend itself to any of the older forms of government
supervision. . . . Regulation and standardization therefore were necessary but
impossible within the framework of existing institutions.”129
The battle for control raged. In January 1922, the Department of
Commerce ordered all amateurs to stop broadcasting to attempt to bring order to
the airwaves.130 Meanwhile, the post office continued to fight, introducing
resolutions in Congress in 1922 and 1923.131 House Resolution 14196, for
example, sought “to launch a legislative program projecting an ultimate
monopoly of electrical means of transmission under postal auspices,” but “the
measure had little support.”132 Hoover, in 1921, had established the
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Government Broadcasting, including
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representatives from ten government departments and agencies. He was hoping
to gain a mandate for control of radio in the Department of Commerce and to stir
up business sentiment against the Navy, which was still reaching for broad
control of radio and interfering with business operations. The Navy launched a
publicity campaign in 1922 to promote its own cause, and the post office
continued to claim “all rights for the transmission of government materials,” a
position that “effectively isolated the postal service from the navy and the
Commerce Department and drastically curtailed any effect it might have on the
committee.”133
In January 1923, the interdepartmental committee was renamed the
Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee, or IRAC, which recommended a
regulated private system that would be available to the government in the event
of war.134 The growing institutionalization of corporate control prompted RCA
President James G. Harbord to declare by the end of 1923 that “the ‘heresy of
government ownership, especially in radio matters,’ no longer persisted in the
federal bureaucracy.”135 Rosen compares the radio trust broadcasting alliance to
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railroad pools that would fix prices and divide profits.136 They didn’t fix prices,
but the radio trust essentially colluded with Commerce to protect and preserve
the system that would best serve its members interests. Despite the introduction
of numerous bills and resolutions in Congress, policymaking was delayed as
radio continued to grow and change.137
The search for money — how to profit not just off the sale of radio sets but
off broadcasting itself — led to ideas and experimentation. Broadcasting was
mostly local and the work of amateurs. As AT&T experimented with new
strategies to dominate radio, it shifted attention away from selling transmitters
and began constructing commercial facilities designed to transmit paid
messages. By 1922, AT&T received a license to operate its own station, WEAF in
New York City, as a facility available for hire; with this, advertising-supported
“toll broadcasting” was born.138 David Sarnoff, then vice president of RCA, took
the next step toward modern forms when he proposed in 1922 “the
establishment of a high-quality, nationwide broadcasting organization to be
called the ‘Public Service Broadcasting Company or National Radio Broadcasting
Company or American Radio Broadcasting Company, or some similar name’.”139
Sarnoff suggested that the company would include in addition to business men
136
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“a few men from outside, prominent in national or civic affairs.”140 Sarnoff even
proposed a system of licensing based on private radio sales, not through
government, as would happen in Britain with the creation of the British
Broadcasting Company around the same time, in 1922.
Meanwhile, Hoover proceeded to grant licenses and organize some
broadcasters on specific bandwidths, shifting stations operated by private
businesses into the government band of the spectrum even though he had no
legal authority to do so.141 By 1924, however, “[T]he industry began to establish
its own priorities separate and distinct from the Commerce Department and
began to support an alternative approach to control under an administrative
official.”142 The “industry,” at this point, rather than being a cohesive set of
commercial interests as the term implies, was still a diverse mix of private
broadcasters, ranging from the four radio giants to department stores and
newspapers to universities and churches, all competing for limited spectrum and
growing weary of Hoover’s messy, extralegal approach. Nevertheless, the vision
of control of radio by an administrative official would ultimately anticipate the
regulatory commissions of the New Deal and the creation of the Federal Radio
Commission in 1927.
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Broadcasters eventually favored regulation because stations were plagued
by interference due to a lack of control.143 As Hoover famously commented, “I
think this is probably the only industry of the United States that is unanimously
in favor of having itself regulated.”144 The dominant commercial players in the
industry, of course, wanted to be regulated in a very specific way that would
allow them to control the prime real estate in the radio spectrum.
By 1923, with so many groups and individuals competing for the
airwaves, Hoover declared the spectrum “closed” and refused to issue any new
licenses, which led to a federal appeals court ruling that said Commerce could
not deny licenses but could assign frequencies.145 Effectively, the Department of
Commerce could do little more than register broadcasters and call for selfregulation. Meanwhile, the department worked to craft legislation that would
give the department the power it needed to accomplish its goals, and many of
these early attempts at legislation invoked the public interest and public service.
For example, the commerce department helped to design House bill 11964, “To
amend the Radio Act of 1912,” which was discussed before the House
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Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries in early 1923.146 The bill that
would become the 1927 Radio Act was starting to take shape, but at this point the
regulatory power was still vested in the Commerce Department rather than an
independent commission. The proposed bill gave Commerce power to grant
licenses and stated that a license could be revoked “whenever the Secretary of
Commerce shall deem such revocation to be in the public interest.”147
Hiram Percy Maxim, representing the American Radio Relay League, an
association of amateur operators, was among the witnesses who testified before
the committee.148 Maxim was not opposed to the idea of vesting licensing power
in the Department of Commerce — indeed, nearly everyone accepted that some
system of licensing was unavoidable — but Maxim was concerned that the bill
made it too easy to push amateurs aside. He contested some language in the
proposed bill, fearing that “public service” could provide a rationale for
withholding a license from an amateur. Maxim said: “This is not fair or just to
the amateurs of the country, and we hope nothing ulterior is intended in this
peculiar wording.”149
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Representative Wallace H. White of Maine responded, using “public
interest” interchangeably with “public service.” He said he beleived the bill
aimed to convey the notion that “the work of the amateur by and large was in
the public interest, certainly it was not intended to exclude him.”150 In theory,
amateur operators would be protected by the public interest, but the vagueness
of the term raised questions. White even reflected on the problematic nature of
the “public service” language, as possibly offering too much protection in legal
terms:

I was a little fearful myself of that language, ‘general public service.’
Those of us who are lawyers realize that when we speak of a public
service corporation we speak of a distinctive class of corporate form. It is
not intended to narrow it to a public utility, and I think, perhaps, the
language might be improved.151

White also wrote that the “whole theory followed in drafting the bill was to get
away from specific statutory limitations” on the grounds that “a statutory
provision might be obsolete tomorrow.”152 The tendency among regulators was
to do as little regulating as possible, and this was for two interconnected reasons.
150
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First, policymakers generally had weak understandings of the new technology,
especially as it was constantly undergoing change and innovation. Second, they
did not want to produce legislation that would be accused of limiting or stifling
this innovation.
The proposed legislation reflected this hesitancy. One engineer objected to
provisions in the bill “to amend the Radio Act of 1912” that “would give the
power to the Secretary of Commerce to exclude, from the requirements of the
regulations hereby prescribed or authorized, any radio station and the operators
required therein…in which he shall find that such action will facilitate commerce
and will not be incompatible with the public interest.”153 This sort of vague
provision gave Hoover and the commerce department the power to do what they
wanted “in the public interest.” The committee’s chairman, William S. Greene,
replied plainly: “That is what we are going to try to do, of course. We have been
at this business for a number of years and we have been trying to liberalize it and
not to hamper it.”154
Not surprisingly, the RCA favored the bill, saying in a letter to the
committee:

The Radio Corporation [of America] is of the opinion that the purposes of
the bill are in the interests of the American public to adequately provide
153
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for regulations which will foster rather than hinder the scientific
development of the art, and because it provides what radio needs, a
flexible, mobile regulating power.155

RCA proposed adding language that would give preference to the dominant
broadcasters in matters regarding licensing. The RCA letter, signed by William
Brown, RCA’s vice president and general attorney, proposed that “the Secretary
of Commerce shall take into due consideration the existence and location of
existing stations, the property interests, investments, and any equities involved
therein, as well as the special adaptability, if any, of the apparatus therein located
for use in specific bands of wave lengths.”156 RCA also wanted the bill to protect
the property rights of established broadcasters, namely RCA. It proposed
language saying, “the Secretary of Commerce may in the public interest or for
protection of private property rights prevent the erection and operation of any
station hereunder in a location where the operation thereof would materially
interfere with the operation of, or property rights in, an existing radio station.”157
This idea that the public interest should be associated with efficient station
operation unencumbered by interference would become central to the Federal
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Radio Commission’s approach to licensing after 1927. RCA was helping to write
the script that policymakers would come to rely on.
Even Hoover, when speaking before congressional committees, frequently
invoked the public interest regarding regulation, but usually in vague ways or
simply to refer to the idea that the public had become interested in radio.158 In
this sense, the public interest was simply what interested the public. For
example, he told the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
that the high number of receiving stations meant that “the matter has become
one of profound public interest.”159
Despite vague or unclear meanings, the public interest language was
beginning to appear consistently in any legislation related to radio and in the
related congressional hearings. In fact, as early as 1924, House bill 7357, “A Bill to
Regulate Radio Communications, and for Other Purposes,” which also vested
regulatory power in the Department of Commerce, included the “public
convenience, interest, or necessity” language that would appear in the 1927
Act.160 In his testimony related to this bill, Hoover helped give shape to the
public interest language by using it to celebrate the idea that radio had been a
success in the United States because it was not subject to over-regulation, but he
158
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also noted proposed that radio was not merely a business or meant for private
gain. Rather, “[I]t is a public concern impressed with the public trust and to be
considered primarily from the standpoint of public interest to the same extent
and upon the basis of the same general principles as our other public utilities.”161
While Hoover continued to conflate “public interest” and “public
utilities,” something the lawyers involved were increasingly careful to avoid, he
was mainly using the general appeal to the public good to advocate for minimal
regulation. At the same time, Hoover also responded to requests by the Navy to
lengthen the period for which licenses would be granted. Hoover defended the
need for short licensing periods, which would retain power in his hands to make
adjustments as technological conditions continued to change. He told the
committee that the question of license duration “would go to the heart of the
whole question of the public interest in radio” and that “the use of wave lengths
in the ether was a public function, a matter of public interest, and should be
retained by the Government on behalf of the public.162 Again, the appeal to the
public good and public interest was a way to justify power and control in his
hands.
Hoover put up such a fight for control of radio, it was almost tragic that
the regulatory framework he was fighting so hard for would eventually be given
by Congress not to him but to an independent commission. Although
161
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government policy in the 1920s, haphazard as it was, clearly favored
corporations and the military, by this time, the popular conception of the
airwaves and how they would be used was well established: “Whether saving
lives at sea or bringing lectures to the farmer, radio was consistently cast as the
agent of American democracy and altruism.”163 Susan Douglas suggests that the
airwaves needed an altruistic caretaker, and the corporate radio broadcasters
worked to position themselves for this role so as to minimize government
interference. Douglas wrote:

The badge of legitimacy went to the communications corporations, who
burnished its authority by presenting themselves as acting out of
benevolent, farsighted paternalism. There were dissenters from this
conception of spectrum management, especially among amateurs,
educators, and religious groups, and there was some resentment in the
1920s about a potential corporate monopoly of the air. But there was no
major break in this ideological frame concerning who was best qualified to
serve as warden of the ether.164

This corporate paternalism would find parallels in British radio, for the BBC has
been described as acting out of the same sort of cultural concern, which will be
163
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discussed later. What is striking is that even though American paternalism could
be seen in the dominant communication corporations and British paternalism
came from a government monopoly, both sets of institutions had a similar
approach to their social and cultural role in the mid-1920s. Once again, the
similarities between the two countries suggest that although causal chains were
being laid, they would have to be broken at some point in order to produce
divergent outcomes. Douglas ends her story of American radio in 1922,
suggesting that the links in the chain of U.S. radio policy were established and
unbreakable. But further investigation challenges this notion. Until the passage
of the Radio Act of 1927, the commercial structure of radio was hardly a foregone
conclusion, and even after 1927, it could hardly be considered stable. Thus,
throughout the 1920s, policymakers and a diverse group of public and private
interests continued to fight for control of broken chains, as exemplified by
Hoover and his series of radio conferences.

HERBERT HOOVER AND THE NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCES
The system of broadcast regulation that would emerge from the chaos of
the early- and mid-1920s “has been much criticized as a confused jumble of
laissez-faire and statist principles.”165 This was the result of efforts by the
government and industry to find a solution to a clear instance of market failure,
165
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and it was the broad goal Secretary Hoover set out to achieve in the 1920s when
he called a series of National Radio Conferences, one each year from 1922
through 1925. More specifically, William Rowland describes the conferences as
“the principal federal government efforts reviewing the options for radio
regulation in the mid-1920s,” and suggests that, “while adopting a public interest
gloss,” the conferences “were envisioning its application in the context of the
well rehearsed cooperation between the government and the private
communications industries over the preceding two decades.”166 Rowland
concludes that the conferences ensured that the government would implement
little direct regulation, the idea of public service would mean technological
capability, and that license holders would be subject to no specific
responsibilities or requirements.167
Hoover preferred a system of “regulated individualism,”168 which was on
full display during the four National Radio Conferences in the 1920s. In his
memoirs, he conveyed the struggle he faced with limited regulatory power and
legal authority even as he worked to move the progress of radio forward and
control the increasingly chaotic airwaves. This was to be done “in our usual
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fashion of solving problems wherever possible by cooperation rather than by
law.”169 That the titans of industry desired a monopoly of the airwaves — a
property of “enormous financial value”170 — apparently was not lost on Hoover.
He was also eager to cooperate with them, in his “usual fashion,” devising
systems of self-regulation rather than making laws.171 He also saw the enormous
potential for radio to reach into every American home and provide great benefit
to the public, not just as consumers but also as citizens.
The First National Radio Conference convened in Washington in 1922
with more than 1,000 delegates in attendance. The delegates came from a range
of government departments, industry, utilities, institutes and universities. In his
opening address, Hoover stated:

We are indeed today upon the threshold of a new means of widespread
communication of intelligence that has the most profound importance
from the point of view of public education and public welfare. The
comparative cheapness…of receiving sets…bids fair to make them almost
universal in the American home.172
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Even in this first conference, Hoover invoked the notion of the public
interest, but did so in the context of “central stations” and the “communication of
commercial matters,” referring to the increasingly dominant private broadcasters
who ran stations for the purpose of publicizing their businesses.173 His opening
statement expressed the central dilemma at the time: Who is in charge of the
airwaves? Again he invoked the public interest and, in expressing his views on
advertising, made one of his most famous, oft-quoted statements: “[I]t becomes
of primary public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under what
circumstances, and with what type of material. It is inconceivable that we should
allow so great a possibility for service to be drowned in advertising chatter.”174
Hoover also described to his audience the dilemma of how to finance
broadcasting stations, which was a relatively new concern, shifting the focus
away from the sale of receiving sets. In two sentences, Hoover described and
rejected the general European model: “In certain countries, the government has
prohibited the use of receiving instruments except upon payment of a fee, out of
which are supported government-sending stations. I believe that such a plan
would most seriously limit the development of the art and its social
possibilities.”175 The only alternative was a system of regulation required a
“policeman” and the establishment of “public right over the ether roads.” The
173
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“policeman” would be responsible for detecting the “ether hogs that are
endangering the traffic.”176 Hoover concluded: “There must be no national regret
that we have parted with a great national asset.”177
The outcome of this first national conference made clear reference to radio
as a public utility to be operated in the public interest. Following the conference,
the Commerce Department prepared a report that concluded: “That it is the
sense of the conference that radio communication is a public utility and as such
should be regulated and controlled by the Federal Government in the public
interest.”178 The report would also lay out definitions for different types of
broadcasting, including government, public, private and toll. Public broadcasting
was defined as “signifying broadcasting by public institutions, including State
governments political subdivisions thereof, and universities and such others as
may be licensed for the purpose of disseminating informational and educational
service.” Toll broadcasting was defined as “signifying broadcasting where
charge is made for the use of the transmitting station.”179 That these early
distinctions were made in 1922 suggests that much remained to be determined
about the organization of the airwaves. The report also laid out considerations to
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be followed in the granting of licenses and offered preference to stations with
high degrees of public interest: “It is recommended that the degree of public
interest attaching to a private or toll broadcasting service be considered in
determining its priority in the granting of licenses, in the assignment of wave
frequencies, and in the assignment of permissible power and operating time,
within the general regulations for these classes of service.”180 In this invocation,
the idea of “general interest” stations begins to receive priority over propaganda
or special interest stations, which would include churches and political groups.
Three more “conferences of the industry”181 were held in Washington, the
second in March 1923 and the third in October 1924. In these early years, Hoover
“felt we should have more experience before drafting legislation. With the
approval of the Congressional committees we carried on until 1924.” Congress
was not ready to take on such a complicated topic and did not see any great
urgency to deal with radio. “One of our troubles in getting legislation was the
very success of the voluntary system we had created. Members of the
Congressional committees kept saying, ‘It is working well, so why bother?’ A
long period of delay ensued.”182
In his opening statement at the third radio conference in 1924, Hoover
expressed his continued hope for the future of radio. Even as the broadcasting
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industry began to take shape, Hoover again equated the technology to a public
utility and expressed concern for its impact on “family life.”183 He concluded by
again invoking the public interest. Despite his grand rhetoric, his contextual
language at this point does not necessarily suggest an understanding of the
concept as a code word for pro-industry regulation as Rowland and others have
suggested. He speaks of the position of elites with a self-imposed “high sense of
service” in the public interest, and he again invokes parallels with public
utilities.184
In one sense, he is advocating self-regulation by broadcasters in order to
avoid legislation that might have limited their power. But in doing so, he is
highlighting a moralistic concern that would have lasting effects. When the
Federal Radio Commission was created in 1927, broadcasters were not sure how
the new commission would treat the industry, and, for some time, broadcasters
considered themselves guests in the home, making efforts to limit the extent to
which they exploited their power for commercial aims.185 Perhaps this was an
early attempt to introduce the idea of social responsibility, in that he suggested
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broadcasters should avoid direct advertising and provide important social and
political content.
At the fourth conference in November 1925, Hoover was still advocating
and celebrating industry self-regulation, but began to acknowledge the reality of
the need for government involvement to balance the interests of the industry.186
Among his opening remarks: “I have no hesitation in discussing these questions,
because, as I have said, the more the industry can solve for itself the less will be
the burden on the Government and the greater will be the freedom of the
industry in its own development.”187 This is also where Hoover began to make
the case for technological supremacy. He laid out the costs of operating a
broadcast station and suggested that any limitations on broadcasting would
preclude these well-financed stations from being economically successful. It is
here that his conception of the public interest begins to shift when he suggests
that the public is best served by the “best stations,” that is, the stations with the
most money and best equipment: “If we impose more division of time than at
present, we shall drive the best stations out of action, and the public will be more
poorly served. The choice is between public interest and private desire, and we
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need not hesitate in making a decision.”188 Hoover’s distinction between the
public interest and private desire set up a telling dichotomy. The “public
interest” was now being used as part of the market rhetoric that would come to
dominate radio regulation. In this context, the public interest reflected a defense
of the market, gently regulated by government to make sure the dominant
players would all get a share. In other words, the appeal to the public good was
now code for letting the dominant broadcasters monopolize the airwaves but
only because it was in the interest of the broader community and certainly not
because it would serve individual self-interest.
In this context, Hoover would go on to make other now-famous
statements. This where he said, for example, “The ether is a public medium, and
its use must be for public benefit. The use of a radio channel is justified only if
there is public benefit.”189 His public interest rhetoric grew increasingly vague,
and perhaps began at this point to take on the pro-industry connotation that
would be ascribed to it in the 1927 Radio Act. He said:

I can see no alternative to abandonment of the present system, which
gives the broadcasting privilege to everyone who can raise the funds
necessary to erect a station, irrespective of his motive, the service he
proposes to render, or the number of others already serving his
188
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community. Moreover, we should not freeze the present users of wave
lengths permanently in their favored positions irrespective of their
service. That would confer a monopoly of a channel in the air and deprive
us of public control over it. It would destroy the public assurance that it
will be used for public benefit. There are, indeed, many difficult issues to
be solved, but we have to face them just the same.190

The third and fourth radio conferences established a number of committees
assigned to different tasks, including allocation of spectrum, advertising,
licenses, marine, amateurs, interference and copyright. At the fourth conference,
one committee was tasked with developing legislation and, in its remarks, drew,
perhaps for the first time, a clear distinction between broadcasting and public
utility service, saying that “recognition of the principle of public benefit does not
bring the broadcasting stations into the category of recognized public utilities.”
191

Add to this defense of the commercial broadcasters the very first
resolution appearing in the 1925 conference proceedings. Paul B. Klugh, the
executive chairman of the National Association of Broadcasters, proposed that
the basis of legislation “should be convenience and necessity, combined with
fitness and ability to serve, and due consideration should be given to existing
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stations and the services which they have established.”192 Policy scripts were
being written by the very industry that was to be regulated. “Fitness and ability
to serve” and “due consideration for existing stations” would become central to
the meaning of the public interest along with “convenience and necessity” as the
impending legislation was crafted.
The central alternative to this approach was reflected in the conference
proceedings by Harry J.C. Umberger of Kansas State College, who called for
provisions for the many state and public departments and universities that were
already making good use of the airwaves. Umberger presented a resolution on
behalf of the Department of Agriculture, farmers, and agricultural colleges using
radio. He highlighted radio’s power to educate and produce public service
programs, which would be especially beneficial in rural areas.193 If the “public
interest” had any meaning at all, surely it was reflected in this proposal, which
emphasized service to the public but died in a technical committee. As Rowland
concludes, “As the public interest standard was being adopted in the principal
forum where private and public interests were being authoritatively welcomed
and their results officially sanctioned, the public service notion of broadcasting, a
model that would appear to have been central to the public interest, was being
systematically ignored.”194
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Meanwhile, the Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station195 case, which
relied on a common law property rights solution at the state level, showed a
possible alternative to Hoover’s preferred method of regulation, and Congress
had to act quickly to make sure this alternative did not take root.196 “That the
political marketplace pointedly vetoed a property rights solution that would
bypass regulators and legislators while holding entry open into broadcasting
was not a reflection of technical incompetence but of self-interested
rationality,”197 Thomas Hazlett wrote. American policymakers knew what they
were doing when they instituted their preferred solution, a complex powersharing arrangement between government and industry, Hazlett suggested.
In sum, the Fourth National Radio Conference and the mid-1920s
generally marked the shift of the meaning of the public interest to give it a clear
pro-industry connotation, to divorce broadcasting from any notion of public
utility service, and to establish a preference for existing commercial broadcasters
who already possessed the technology necessary to provide a national
broadcasting service. By delaying legislation in its hesitancy to restrict private
business, Congress allowed time for the dominant commercial broadcasters to
gain power over the Navy, the post office and amateurs. Thus, the big
195

Gen. No. B-1 36,864 (1926) (Cook Co., Ill., Circ. Ill.).

196

See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.

OF L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
197

Id. at 175.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether 69
communications corporations were poised to come out on top with the creation
of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927.
The mid-1920s had seen increasing chaos as amateurs and non-corporate
broadcasters including universities, religious groups and labor organizations
competed for the airwaves with the emerging commercial stations operated by
private businesses. The messy situation finally came to a head when the
government sued the Zenith Corporation for violating spectrum-use rules in its
broadcasts and a district court found in 1926 that Secretary Hoover was in fact
powerless to regulate broadcasting under the 1912 Radio Act. 198 This opinion
was confirmed by the attorney general, who wrote, “[T]he present legislation is
inadequate to cover the art of broadcasting, which has been almost entirely
developed since the passage of the 1912 Act. If the present situation requires
control, I can only suggest that it be sought in new legislation, carefully adapted
to meet the needs of both the present and the future.”199 In this context, Congress
would finally decide to act.

THE BIRTH OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING COMPANY
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At the start of the 1920s, Britain had not yet decided what path its
broadcasting system would take.200 As in the United States, Britain had instituted
a ban on amateur radio during the first world war, and as in the United States,
the ban was lifted in 1919. As amateur operators resumed their work, the
realization that broadcasting regular entertainment over the airwaves could
stimulate the sale of wireless receivers came to British radio manufacturers, just
as it had in the U.S. But the U.S. radio companies had become more
technologically advanced than British Marconi and the other British
manufacturers, possibly because the U.S. had lost less time to the war.
“America’s lead time was envied in Britain and quickened the pace of
development in Britain, but the use made by American broadcasters of their lead
served as a warning rather than an example,”201 Asa Briggs wrote. Perhaps the
British system was slow to catch up, but this may have been an advantage in that
it gave regulators more time to observe what was happening in the United States
and to think about how to approach the new technology.
Still, commercial pressures did exist in Britain, and the broadcasting boom
in the United States didn’t help. After the war, the national security argument for
government control of broadcasting gave way to pressure from wireless
manufacturers and amateur radio operators to authorize a regular broadcasting
200
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service.202 As a result, the post office allowed the Marconi Company to broadcast
from a sole transmitter at Writtle near Chelmsford but warned them not to
encroach on military transmissions. The Post Office eventually allowed a few
other stations to broadcast but never granted any official, permanent licenses to
operate due to the unresolved question of how to deal with the technological
problem of spectrum scarcity, the limited availability of frequencies on which to
broadcast. The Marconi Company began experimental broadcasting in February
1920, but did not begin a regular broadcasting service until February 14, 1922, a
full year-and-a-half after the first KDKA broadcast in the United States Marconi’s
London station, 2LO, began broadcasting — under major restrictions — on May
11, 1922. Other radio manufacturers soon began to show interest. At that point,
the post office, “[A]nxious to avoid the chaos that had arisen from unrestrained
broadcasting in the United States and unwilling to have to arbitrate between
rival interests in the British radio industry,” negotiated the formation of a cartel
of the radio manufacturers.203 In the spring of 1922, discussions between the
various radio manufacturers and the post office led to the formation of the
British Broadcasting Company. (It would remain a “company” until it became
the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1927.) The Company began broadcasting
on November 14, 1922, but did not receive an official license from the post office
until January 18, 1923.
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Before this could happen, though, a few decisions had to be made. F.J.
Brown, an assistant secretary at the post office, had been visiting the United
States and attended Hoover’s First National Radio Conference in early 1922. The
lessons he learned about frequency chaos were apparent in a report made by the
postmaster general in Parliament in 1922:

…it would be impossible to have a large number of firms broadcasting.
That is physically impossible. It would result in a sort of chaos, only in a
much aggravated form than that which has arisen in the United States of
America, and which has compelled the United States, or the Department
over which Mr. Hoover presides, and who is responsible for broadcasting,
to do what we are now doing at the beginning, that is, proceed to lay
down very drastic regulations, indeed, for the control of wireless
broadcasting.204

Thus, when the post office received twenty new applications for permission to
broadcast in the spring of 1922, the reply was always “the ether is already
full.”205 In the sense of closing the ether, Britain’s post office was a full year
ahead of Hoover’s commerce department. Instead of the indiscriminate granting
of licenses, the British Postmaster General F.G. Kellaway told Parliament that he
204

HC Hansard Deb 04 August 1922 vol 157 cc1951-75, 1956.

205

BRIGGS, supra note 16, at 85.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether 73
would “ask all those who apply — the various firms who have applied — to
come together at the Post Office and co-operate so that an efficient service may
be rendered and that there may be no danger of monopoly and that each service
shall not be interfering with the efficient working of the other.”206 This early view
expressed a concern for striking a balance between efficiency of service and
maintaining equal barriers to entry.
That same spring, the Wireless Sub-Committee of the Imperial
Communications Committee began designing the strict set of controls that would
govern operations of the British Broadcasting Company. By 1922, the syndicate
of six private British companies had an effective monopoly over the airwaves,
although “it was at first denied that the British Broadcasting Company was a
monopoly, because entry into the company was allowed to any genuine British
manufacturer in the radio industry.”207 Complaints about monopoly came mostly
from the popular press, which thought radio would harm newspaper circulation.
The Wireless Sub-Committee of the Imperial Communications Committee
would eventually come up with a set of rules for broadcasting. The
subcommittee set limits on the days and times that broadcasters could use the
airwaves, it placed technical limitations on power and manner of transmissions,
and it ruled that facilities “should be given to bona fide radio manufacturing
companies to broadcast news and educational matter,” which then and later
206
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prevented applicants such as newspapers and retail stores from entering the
industry.208 Furthermore, agreements between the post office and the
manufacturers dictated that the original BBC would be funded by three sources:
original stock, royalties on wireless sets sold by manufacturers, and receiving
licenses collected by the post office from the public. These severe limitations on
such important technical and financial questions provided a sharp contrast to the
American approach, just as they were meant to do in light of the chaos in the
United States. As Briggs noted, “American broadcasting had blundered into
chaos: British broadcasting was to be forced into a strait-jacket.”209
Unresolved matters remained related to questions of control of content.
Postmaster General Kellaway had said that “there will be certain regulations in
regard to the character and classes of news which these agencies will be allowed
to transmit, but on that head I have not yet come to a final decision.”210 Kellaway
avoided questions about censorship of content, but this early statement about
“character and class” suggested the possibility of content control through some
means and anticipated the leadership of John Reith.211 At the same time, at least
part of Kellaway’s concern about “content” had to do with the calls from the
British press that broadcasters should be restricted from producing original news
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reports so as to minimize competition with the newspaper industry. Kellaway
also had to contend with members of Parliament who attacked the emerging
plan for broadcasting as monopolistic and in violation of free trade. He
responded by saying that the post office’s approach actually promoted
competition in broadcasting and would serve national business interests by
restricting access by foreign radio manufacturers to Britain’s radio market.212
Ultimately, Kellaway and the post office took their time in addressing these
matters. “It was the concern of the post office with matters like these—matters
which involved its conception of the ‘public interest’—which held back progress
in the late summer and autumn of 1922,”213 Briggs wrote. Kellaway wanted to
ensure that the broadcasting service to emerge from the Post Office’s long
deliberations would be one he would not have to defend to angry members of
Parliament, the press, the broadcasters, the radio manufacturers, or the public. 214
He knew, whatever the outcome, he would be held responsible.
One month after the British Broadcasting Company began regular
broadcasts, it hired a general manager named John Reith, a 34-year-old Scottish
engineer who knew nothing about broadcasting but came highly
recommended.215 Reith, from the start, had concluded that broadcasting was a
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“precious national resource — too precious to be used merely to deliver
audiences to advertisers or even to wireless manufacturers.”216 Reith wanted the
BBC to operate as a monopoly, remain institutionally independent, be funded by
a license fee, be accessible to all, and maintain high standards.217 These
characteristics were not simply the original thinking of Reith; they had
organizational precedents in Britain in the context of the rise of the public
corporation in the early 1900s.218 The forestry, gas, water and electricity
industries had been organized as public corporations and designed to combine
the best of civil and commercial values.219 Thus, the BBC already possessed some
of these qualities before Reith’s arrival. The structures already in place, to some
extent, dictated that the technology would eventually be organized as a public
resource. The early shareholder rates of return were modest, and the companies
were never driven primarily by profit. Perhaps most significant is the fact that
the British government approved the licensing fee from the beginning to cushion
the BBC from having to rely too heavily on profit.
Considering all this, to say that the BBC began as a private company is
somewhat misleading. The company was so heavily regulated by government
that it was basically a public institution from the start, and much of its funding
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came from royalties and licenses collected by government on the company’s
behalf. All of this had happened somewhat haphazardly, largely in reaction to
the perceived chaos in the United States. But as Paddy Scannell and David
Cardiff and others argue, the initial goal was to create a market for the sale of
radio receivers; the notion of broadcasting as a public service came later.220
Notably, however, the public service concept did come, and it came even though
there was no real need for it. The public service approach may have actually been
detrimental to the demand for radio sets; perhaps an American-style,
commercial, entertainment-oriented approach to broadcasting would have made
radio in Britain all the more popular. But John Reith wouldn’t have it. Reith’s
approach to public service broadcasting in 1924 had been informed and
emboldened the year before by the work and report of The Broadcasting
Committee, better known as the Sykes Committee, on which Reith served as a
member.

JOHN REITH AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC SERVICE
It seems that Reith had a sense of the grandeur of what was about to
happen. In an entry in his diary dated December 28, 1922, just a month-and-ahalf after his hiring, Reith wishes for his mother to live to see him made a
knight.221 He continues:
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I feel if this job succeeds and I am given grace to succeed in it, I might not
be so far off this. I do want a title for dear Mother’s sake and Muriel’s [his
wife] and other similar reasons. May I never forget dear Mother’s prayer. I
must take Christ with me from the very beginning and all through this
difficult work. I cannot succeed otherwise. “Without me ye can do
nothing.” I can do all things through Christ.222

In many ways, this sounds downright delusional. But he was not far off. This
also makes clear how Reith would carry his strong religious background with
him in his work at the BBC. As Briggs notes, “Reith’s whole conception of moral
standards derived from Christian principles.”223 But these principles meant more
to Reith than mere moralizing over the airwaves. They would inform his view of
the public, of economics and of technology.
As Briggs points out, Reith never refers to “mass media” or “mass
communication” in any of his writings. Instead he emphasizes the “public” or
the “publics” as part of “the great audience,” not to be analyzed for tastes and
preferences to be pandered to, but as humans in need of cultural enrichment and
fulfillment. Briggs writes:
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The “publics” are treated with respect not as nameless aggregates with
statistically measurable preferences, “targets” for the programme sponsor,
but as living audiences capable of growth and development. In other
words, Reith’s theory of public service began with a conception of the
public. Without such a conception the conception of public service itself
becomes bleak and arid.224

It is easy to imagine how this sort of approach would earn Reith charges of
elitism and socialism, which he did not shy from. In his book Broadcast Over
Britain, written hastily in 1924, Reith countered these charges with simple
appeals to reason: “To disregard the spread of knowledge, with the consequent
enlargement of opinion, and to be unable to supplement it with reasoned
arguments, or to supply satisfactory answers to legitimate and intelligent
questions, is not only dangerous but stupid.”225 Reith’s book, one of the most
important documents in the history of broadcasting, expresses a bold vision for
public service broadcasting and did much to influence the future of the BBC. It is
important to note that Reith’s approach to public service broadcasting in 1924
had been informed and emboldened the year before by the work and report of
the Broadcasting Committee, better known as the Sykes Committee, on which
Reith served as a member.
224
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The Sykes Committee, named for its chairman Sir Frederick Sykes, was
appointed by the postmaster general April 24, 1923, to consider “broadcasting in
all its aspects” as well as “the action which should be taken upon the
determination of the existing licence of the Broadcasting Company” and the
“restrictions which may need to be placed upon its user or development.”226 The
committee recognized the future importance of the new technology and began its
work under the assumption that “the control of such a potential power over
public opinion and the life of the nation ought to remain with the State, and that
the operation of so important a national service ought not to be allowed to
become an unrestricted commercial monopoly.”227 To this end, the committee
declared the airwaves to be “regarded as a valuable form of public property; and
the right to use them for any purpose should only be given after full and careful
consideration.”228 The committee also recognized from the start that the outcome
it recommended was likely to have a lasting effect, opening and closing certain
alternative paths. The committee declared that any wavelengths “assigned to any
particular interest should be subject to the safeguards necessary to protect the
public interest in the future. Should readjustments become necessary after
definite allocations of the national property, they may be found both difficult and
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costly.”229 Indeed, exit costs are central to the concept of path dependence and
explain why it is hard to stray from chosen paths. These costs can be material or
nonmaterial, as is the case with the inefficient QWERTY keyboard still used. In
the case of broadcasting, substantial costs, both material and nonmaterial, would
be involved in attempts to alter future paths in both Britain and the United
States.
Due to the provisional nature of the agreements governing British
broadcasting, the Sykes Committee was asked to respond to the original license
granted to the British Broadcasting Company in January 1923.230 The license
outlined all the ways in which the Company was already operating like a public
monopoly.231 Manufacturers had to pay to join and be approved by the
postmaster general. The post office issued broadcast receiving licenses and sets
were marked “BBC — Type approved by Postmaster General.” The post office
paid the Company half of the licensing fees received. And receiving sets had to
be British-made and carry a tax payment to the company as approved by the
postmaster general. Furthermore, no “advertising or paid matter” was to be
broadcast, and “only such news as is obtained from news agencies approved by
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the Postmaster General” was allowed. The Company also was “not to pay
dividends at a higher rate than 7.5 per cent per annum.”232
It is fine to say that technical restrictions on wavelengths and policies
regarding Company organization were due to the limited nature of the airwaves,
or at least the current understanding of the airwaves at the time. And the
restrictions on types of radio sets to be used and the requirement of receiving
licenses were certainly meant to help national industry and increase revenue for
the post office. But the restrictions on content — certain types of news and
advertising — reflect different interests. The limits on news broadcasts and
advertising were meant to protect the publishing industry, although these
restrictions on news would loosen throughout the decade, partly due to Reith’s
insistence. As Scannell and Cardiff note: “The restrictive attitude of the Post
Office which, at the time, had forbidden the BBC to deal with any matters of
public controversy, was severely restricting the development of this side of
broadcasting, and Reith sharply criticized the shackles imposed on radio’s
treatment of news and politics.”233
The restrictions on advertising, however, reflect perhaps the biggest
difference between the British and American approaches to broadcasting.
Beyond protecting newspapers, the Sykes Committee feared that advertising
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would lead to lower standards and make the service unpopular.234 The
Committee reports that it would be permissible to accept the “gift” of a concert
and broadcast the name of the donor, or to name the publisher and price of a
song to be played. It also ruled on the “Broadcasting of Commercial
Information,” saying “this would be permitted if extra revenue is needed, but
limited to a block of five minutes per hour, for example, and under suitable
safeguards.”235 These sorts of declarations, coming from the mainstream
policymakers, were unlike what was happening in the United States in 1923.
Although Hoover had claimed to be opposed to advertising — it was
“inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for service…to be
drowned in advertising chatter,” He declared at the first radio conference in
1922236 — this grand rhetoric never worked itself into any specific
recommendations or requirements as it would in Britain.
One reason for this was that radio in the United States had developed so
quickly and with so little regulatory authority that there had been no time to
implement an organized, universal approach to financing broadcasting. Britain’s
slightly late arrival to the radio craze gave it a great advantage in this regard. The
aims of the original British approach to radio had been “to secure the early
establishment of an efficient and attractive broadcasting service without cost to
234
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the taxpayer and without the establishment of any manufacturing monopoly,”237
and the outcome in 1923 was thought by many to have actually achieved this
goal. The Company was a consortium of manufacturers rather than a monopoly
of one, and the cost for broadcasting was paid by the end user in the form of the
radio license. Barring the early introduction of such a licensing scheme, it would
be difficult to implement such an approach later. The committee’s approach to
the funding model, while resting on “the educative value of broadcasting,”238
precluded a tax on the general population. Instead, the committee approved of
the licensing fee approach and recommended that “the Government should not
aim at making a profit on the control of the service or the licensing of wireless
sets.”239
It is worth noting that some Britons evaded the licensing fee by building
their own sets. The promise had been made in the House of Commons in July
1922 that “amateurs who construct their own receiving sets…will be allowed to
use them.” It was

[T]he view then taken by the Post Office being that if an applicant were
sufficiently skilled to make his own apparatus he would have sufficient
knowledge to make proper use of an experimental license, which is free of
237
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the restriction inserted in the broadcasting license as to the type of
apparatus.240

Based on this early promise, radio parts, both domestic and foreign-made, began
to appear on the market, undermining the official Company sets, because
homemade sets were cheaper. Ultimately, “[T]he Post Office agreed in January,
1923, to issue experimental licenses only to persons with unquestionable
qualifications, the applications from other persons being held over for further
consideration.”241 They discussed the possibility of a “constructor’s” license for
those who wanted to use homemade sets, but this never became a reality, as the
post office and the Company could never come to an agreement on the
conditions under which such a license would be issued.
This problem was indicative of one of the central objections to the scheme
thus far. The Sykes Committee noted that these objections centered on the
notions that it was wrong to control the manufacture and importation of wireless
apparatus, and that firms had to join the Company in order to manufacture and
sell apparatus. It was wrong that “the Company is practically controlled by a few
large firms, who, it is suggested, are placed in a position of advantage over
smaller trade rivals,” and “certain conditions of the agreement which members
of the British Broadcasting Company have to sign are of an oppressive character
240
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or give the Company powers which might be used harshly.”242 Despite these
objections, the Sykes Committee did not hesitate to recommend “that permission
to transmit, and the matter to be transmitted, should be subject to public
authority.”243 That the Committee would include the “matter to be transmitted”
was an early indication that someone would be in charge of the content of
broadcasting. The Committee proposed a broadcasting board to work out the
details in conjunction with the post office.
As to the question of state operation, the Sykes Committee recognized that
“once the principle of public control is established, it is evident that considerable
latitude is possible in deciding by whom broadcasting should be operated.”244
The committee recognized that the actual operation of so important a national
service “should be in the hands of the Government rather than in private
hands.”245 On the other hand, the committee also recognized that government
would not be suited to handle entertainment programming and that it would be
subject to criticism regarding political power and influence. The governmentcontrolled operation “would be constantly open to suspicion that it was using its
unique opportunities to advance the interests of the political party in power; and,
in the endeavour to avoid anything in the slightest degree controversial, it would
242
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probably succeed in making its service intolerably dull.”246 Ultimately the
committee’s recommendation favored state control but noted that “care should
be taken to interfere as little as possible with the broadcast programming.”247
The committee’s final recommendation was the creation of the
Broadcasting Board to assist the postmaster general, noting that “the
broadcasting service should not be operated by a Government Department, but
that those entrusted with the service should work under Governmental
licence.”248 This recommendation was in keeping with the scheme established
under the original Company license but suggested and anticipated the
transformation of the Company into a public corporation. It is significant that
although these recommendations in the interest of public service originated with
the British government, they were realized by the broadcasters themselves. As
Scannell and Cardiff note, this

[D]efinition of broadcasting as a public utility to be developed as a
national service in the public interest came from the state. The
interpretation of that definition, the effort to realize its meaning in the
development of a programme service guided by considerations of national
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service and the public interest, came from the broadcasters and above all
from John Reith.249

Reith’s vision was informed by his desire to use the new technology to serve the
public by encouraging widespread access to knowledge and culture.
Reith was eager to promote his cause and to defend his approach in the
face of criticisms of the elitist monopoly. “I think it will be admitted by all that to
have exploited so great a scientific invention for the purpose and pursuit of
entertainment alone would have been a prostitution of its powers and an insult
to the character and intelligence of the people,”250 he wrote. He also specifically
characterized the Company as a utility and emphasized its non-profit nature:
“The Company operates as a public utility service, and it is of great importance
that this should be definitely recognized. In other words, the Company is not out
to make money for the sake of making money; by its constitution it is debarred
from doing so.”251 Furthermore, Reith argued that a broadcasting service that
operated in this manner would actually benefit British industry rather than
detract from it. “In this business, the interests of the public and the interests of
the trade happen to be identical, even though this may not be apparent at first
sight,” he wrote. “The greater the extent to which, as a public service, the
249
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Company is able to give satisfaction, the greater the benefit to the new British
industry.”252 He also dismissed monopoly concerns by noting that “unity of
control” was essential “in a concern where expansion is so rapid and the
problems so unique.”253 Reith had always preferred the term “unified control”
over “monopoly,” which he avoided using. Finally, he compared the British
system to the American approach, pointing out that the delay in initiating a
broadcasting service in Britain served the country well:

In America broadcasting had been initiated more than a year earlier than
in this country; with characteristic energy it had been developed
wholesale, largely on a commercial basis, and without any method of
control whatsoever. There is no co-ordination, no standard, no guiding
policy; advertising, direct or indirect, is usually the sole means of revenue.
I gather from many American visitors that they consider that the delay
which took place before a service was begun in this country, is more than
justified by the progress subsequently made. There is scarcely a civilized
country of which representatives have not visited us, usually staying for a
period, to absorb something of the procedure and methods of operation.
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We are always glad to see them. We make no copyright of our experience,
however valuable or unique it may be.254

By the mid-1920s, Reith and the Company were facing less and less resistance as
their approach became more and more accepted throughout Britain. For
example, an article in The Times was indicative of the realization that the
monopoly approach was preferable to American-style competition.

But in this case we have to consider the alternative to monopoly: it would
be, almost certainly, confusion, and quite certainly the debasement of an
influence far too permeating to be allowed to be vulgarized….It is now a
monopoly, but in generous and humane hands the interest of the majority
will probably be in its continuing to be a monopoly.255

As this consensus grew, the transformation of the BBC from Company to
Corporation came closer.

THE CRAWFORD COMMITTEE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BBC
Radio in Britain was exploding throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1923,
the post office issued 80,000 receiving licenses. In 1924, it issued one million. And
254
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by 1939, the number was nine million.256 Between 1922 and 1924, nine main
stations and ten relay stations had been set up in England, Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland, and they reached nearly 80% of the population.257 Despite this
growth, in the mid-1920s, there was no discussion in Parliament of major matters
of broadcast policy until late 1926. Rather, Parliament was concerned with setting
up the Empire Wireless Communications Network.258 One notable policy change
was that the embargo against foreign radio receivers was dropped as of
December 31, 1924, because the post office had switched to a single form of
receiving license for all types of equipment. As early as 1923, however, the
postmaster general had already appointed another committee to review the
BBC’s finances.
As early as 1923, the postmaster general had already appointed another
committee to review the BBC’s finances. This second broadcasting committee,
known as the “Crawford Committee” after the chairman, met in 1925 and made
its report in 1926. The goal was “to advise as to the proper scope of the
Broadcasting service and as to the management, control and finance thereof”
after the expiration of the existing Company license, which was set to end on

256

See CRISELL, supra note 110, at 22-24.

257

See SCANNELL & CARDIFF, supra note 23, at 15.

258

Id. at 23.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether 92
December 31, 1926.259 Much like the Sykes Committee, the Crawford Committee
recognized the public service role of broadcasting and rejected advertising on the
grounds that it would lead to lower standards. Monopoly was advocated as an
efficient way to provide successful service and a way to ensure quality
programming. As Valeria Camporesi notes, “Broadcasting had come to be
viewed as too delicate a matter to be left to the market.”260 Not only did the
committee believe that “competition for listeners would force down program
standards,” as Paulu notes, but it was operating in a context where government
monopoly “was strongly supported by the articulate public of that day.”261
Ultimately, there would be no major opposition to the change to public
corporation, which was meant to solidify the monopoly and protect it from both
political and commercial influence by changing it from a regulated private entity
to a government-owned operation protected by royal charter. The post office was
supportive of the change, as was public opinion.262 The committee recommended
the single licensing fee of 10 shillings, and 75% was to go to the BBC.263 It also
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recommended that wireless receiver royalty payments to radio manufacturers
should stop. The licensing system remained problematic, however, as the post
office didn’t want to collect fees on behalf of a private company. Reith
maintained that broadcasting was a public service, and that the public should
pay for it, not advertisers.264 This led Reith and the Crawford Committee to
advocate for making the BBC a public corporation. The British government was
sympathetic, as this institutional model was now popular and widely
accepted.265
Like the Sykes Committee, the Crawford Committee reported that it was
“deeply conscious of the magnitude of the issues involved — not merely as
regards their scientific or mechanical aspects, but still more in relation to their
ultimate impact on the education and temperament of the country.”266 As before,
the Crawford Committee maintained that the “United States system of free and
uncontrolled transmission and reception, is unsuited to this country, and that
Broadcasting must accordingly remain a monopoly — in other words that the
whole organization must be controlled by a single authority.”267 The committee
recommended against the continuation of the current Company license and
instead advocated for a public corporation form of organization. A central reason
264
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for this was to insulate the operations of the broadcasting service from politics
and to provide leeway in selecting content. “Such an authority would enjoy a
freedom and flexibility which a Minister of State himself could scarcely exercise
in arranging for performers and programmes, and in studying the variable
demands of public taste and necessity,”268 it reported.
Furthermore, the committee recommended that the commissioners of the
new corporation “should be persons of judgment and independence, free of
commitments, and that they will inspire confidence by having no other interests
to promote than those of the public service. We hope they will be men and
women of business acumen and experienced in affairs.”269 The committee was
clear that it was authorizing a monopoly “vested by Statute in the whole
Community,” and said that in this context, “the State safeguards the listener
against exploitation; takes steps to maintain the efficiency of the service, and also
exercises its regulative powers without which broadcasting would be thrown
into chaos.”270 Looking to the future, the committee noted that they could not
predict the future of broadcasting and envisioned two different possible
outcomes. “On the one hand it is conceivable that Broadcasting might have to
become a department of State like the telephone service: on the other it is
possible that its character as a monopoly might have to disappear, and that the
268
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rights of transmitting should be distributed.”271 In the latter possibility, the
Crawford Committee anticipated correctly that competition would eventually be
introduced to British broadcasting.
Although Reith was not a member of the Crawford Committee, he and the
committee shared the same vision for broadcasting, and the committee stressed
the educative value of radio. The committee called for the maintenance of high
standards and praised the BBC for having “held the balance between conflicting
tastes with discretion.” The committee recommended that listeners be afforded
“latitude” in available content. “He must not be pressed to assimilate too much
of what he calls ‘highbrow’ broadcast, and the Commissioners would not be wise
in transmitting more educational matter than licensees are prepared to accept. At
the same time every effort must be made to raise the standard of style and
performance.”272 In many ways, Reith and the BBC would inform if not create
the normative roles not just of broadcasting but modern journalism in general,
especially as the BBC began to broadcast more news and public affairs programs
in the late 1920s and 1930s. It is certainly remarkable that Reith would eventually
institute at the BBC the types of goals and norms that would be celebrated and
codified in the decades to come, for example, in the Pilkington Report and
Hutchins Commission. It is worth noting that these norms were largely possible
because of the unique structure of the organization, which “depended on the
271
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rejection of both market forces and politics in favour of efficiency and planned
growth by experts.”273
A problem arose, however, with the 1926 general strike in Britain, during
which questions arose about how a public broadcasting system would cover the
actions of government.274 Some in government, including Winston Churchill, had
growing concerned about seditious speech and wanted to commandeer
broadcasting altogether but were prevented from doing so. As Brian McNair
wrote:

During the 1926 General Strike Winston Churchill, then the Home
Secretary, wanted to take direct control of the BBC and use it openly as a
propaganda tool. He was overruled in government by those who argued
that this would undermine the very thing which made the BBC a valuable
ideological weapon—its perceived independence.275

This does not mean the BBC went without being criticized, for many believed
that the government had exercised some control over coverage of the strike.276
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“Even if it proved possible — thanks largely to the licence fee — to resist the
identification of the BBC with a department of State,” Krishan Kuman wrote,
“there persisted the vexing association of ‘public service’ with service to the State
seen as the embodiment of the national or public interest.”277
The early BBC tended to avoid politics, especially in light of restrictions on
news content that were only gradually lifted. In fact, this may have been one of
the reasons the organization was successful. This was partly due to Reith’s own
predisposition against politics in favor of other fare. As Kuman notes:

The early BBC dealt with the problem by avoiding it. Reith despised
politics and politicians, and sought to maintain the BBC’s independence
by ignoring the contentious and, to him, sterile realm of political
debate….This left the BBC free to get on with what Reith considered the
important talks: building it up as a cultural church. Politics did not matter:
philosophy, religion, music, poetry and drama — laced with ‘light
entertainment’ as ground-bait — did.278

The BBC was widely praised for its attention to these sorts of cultural affairs. At
the same time, the notion of the early BBC as an immediately hailed cultural
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institution speaking for the masses has been challenged. “Its relative newness, its
conception of its role as the guardian of high culture and morality, its selfdenying ordinances against dealing with ‘controversial’ matters, all militated
against a true involvement with the deeper and more varied levels of the
society,”279 Kuman wrote.
But others point out that the BBC’s service of high culture was not a new
idea in Britain, and this is the reason the broadcasting service was successful.
Reith and company were really just riding on the coattails of the success of the
Victorian middle class, which brought the ideal of service to the forefront in late
nineteenth century Britain, as Raymond Williams first suggested. Referencing
Williams, Scannell and Cardiff write: “The Victorian reforming ideal of service
was animated by a sense of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the
community, aimed particularly at those most in need of reforming — the lower
classes.”280 Indeed, the motivation behind the ideal of service wasn’t always so
altruistic, and this is where the BBC earned its reputation as a hegemonic cultural
dictator. Referencing Culture and Anarchy by Matthew Arnold, Scannell and
Cardiff explain the nineteenth-century political motivations for “civilizing” the
masses and “incorporating the working classes within the existing social and
political order, and thus preventing the threat of revolt from below.”281 Whether
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oppressing the masses through cultural hegemony or destroying culture though
standardization and democratization, the BBC was always doing something
wrong in eyes of many cultural critics. But somehow, it still survived, and
Scannell and Cardiff attribute this to the non-commercial nature of the BBC: “If
broadcasting in Britain emerged relatively unscathed from such withering
criticism it was because the BBC, like the cultural critics, rejected the profit
motive as the basis of its institutional existence.”282 Finally something to agree
on.
Ultimately, at the close of 1926, the British government accepted the
recommendations of Reith and the Crawford Committee, and the British
Broadcasting Corporation was born. Unlike the messy, chaotic situation in the
United States, the British approach was more measured and restrictive of private
enterprise. The fact that John Reith and the early British Broadcasting Company
were so perfectly in tune with so many British cultural elites in and out of
government was the main reason for their success. Most Britons, viewing the
American approach to broadcasting as a cautionary tale, were pleased with the
British use of the airwaves and were supportive of the institutionalization of the
BBC as a public corporation operating what had been conceived of in Britain as a
natural monopoly and a public service. While government control of such
services was not unheard of in the U.S., it was far more likely to be accepted in
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Britain due to a history of public control of such aspects of industry, such as the
telegraph. Thus, path-dependent processes continued to shape the role of the
state in the market and society. Causal chains that had been broken in the 1920s
were beginning to reform as the critical juncture was coming to a close. The main
difference seems to be that the chains were broken much longer in the United
States as debate ensued and interests collided throughout the 1920s. For Britain
and the BBC, the period of greatest contingency appeared to be at the start of the
1920s before the original Company was formed. The early decision to form a
heavily regulated monopoly followed by the success of Reith did much to push
aside open competition as a policy alternative. In the United States, it was just
the opposite: public ownership and control was pushed aside as communication
companies were given time to dominate broadcasting in fact if not yet in law.

CONCLUSION
This comparative analysis of path-dependent processes reveals that the
eventual, divergent broadcasting policy outcomes in the United States and Great
Britain, far from being inevitable, were contingent on different understandings of
the public interest. In Britain, the public interest remained tied to earlier notions
of public service, which suggested a regulatory approach that would treat
broadcasting more like a public utility than a commodity to be bought and sold.
In the United States, the public interest over time became wedded to notions of
technological efficiency and economic consumption that gave preference to the
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dominant commercial broadcasters and their advertising-supported networks.
Independently, these findings are not terribly surprising, given that they are
consistent with previous research. But the comparative approach used here and
the attention to path-dependent processes helps this article achieve its goal of
highlighting and explaining the different causes and conditions that led to
divergent outcomes.
Thus, this study has attempted to make three contributions to the existing
literature. First, by employing a comparative approach, this work gains
comparative leverage that helps to identify the differences in the regulatory
approaches taken in the United States and Britain. Second, by taking a long view
and focusing on institutional development and path-dependent processes, this
work has identified the different trajectories and paths not taken that led to the
divergent outcomes. Third, this work has attempted to shed light on the tensions
that arise between markets and society with attention to the role of the state in
regulating communications in particular and industry in general.
First, comparative historical analysis is useful for examining social
phenomena that occur in limited numbers and on large scales over long time
frames. The historical development of broadcasting is this type of social
phenomenon, and the comparative approach helps accentuate the differences in
outcomes and their causes. Histories that focus exclusively or primarily on the
origins of broadcasting in a single country are limited to the debates and
deliberations that took place in the country being investigated. This study gains
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comparative leverage by contrasting the private, commercial, advertisingsupported system of broadcasting that emerged in the United States with the
noncommercial, public monopoly that dominated in Britain. The contrast
emphasizes the point that the American outcome was far from inevitable and
could have easily turned out different. This is also evident in the intense
struggles to control and influence broadcasting policy between the Department
of Commerce, the Navy, the Post Office, various members of Congress, the
communications corporations that dominated private broadcasting, other private
broadcasters such as universities, churches and political groups, and amateur
operators and hobbyists. These American struggles contrast sharply with the
comparatively stable regulatory approach in Britain beginning with the birth of
the British Broadcasting Company in 1922.
Second, the historical comparison highlights the path-dependent
processes that led to these divergent outcomes. The long tradition of government
control of communications in Britain stands apart from the American tendency to
promote private entrepreneurialism and technological innovation that led to the
massive growth of radio in the United States. These different regulatory
approaches were informed by increasingly different conceptions of the public
interest in the two countries beginning in the nineteenth century. While it is
important to “break the chain” of path dependence in order to avoid the problem
of infinite regress, the development of electric communication, particularly the
telegraph, in the 1800s represents an earlier critical juncture with clear path-
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dependent outcomes in both countries. The outcomes for broadcasting were
never guaranteed, but forces of inertia helped to perpetuate policy scripts that
would limit private business in Britain and support it in the United States.
Furthermore, the temporal sequencing of the development of
broadcasting suggests that the United States, in that it was first in developing
radio, served as a cautionary tale in Britain. This is interesting not just because
the timing helped to dictate the outcome but also because the British reacted by
deciding that the American chaos was unacceptable. The acceptability of the
chaos in the United States and not in Britain speaks to the different views of the
role of the state in society generally in allowing or restricting individual selfinterest. Failures to understand the technology aside, the individualistic nature of
the race to develop radio despite the chaos it produced was an acceptable
tradeoff in the United States, where regulatory intervention giving preference to
industry was generally favored over the more citizen-oriented British approach.
What if the causes of the different policy outcomes had been different?
What if World War I had further delayed American commercial development of
radio and Britain had gone first? Given the tradition of British government
regulation of communications, it seems likely that Britain would have pursued a
BBC-type outcome even without the cautionary tale from America. Now
consider the American alternative. What if control of radio had been handed to
the post office or the Navy, both entirely possible outcomes before and after the
first world war? It is easy to imagine a scenario where this would have led to a

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether104
system of government-controlled national radio, although this likely would have
given way to a hybrid competition model much faster than it did in Britain.
Third, the different policy causes and outcomes can be better understood
and explained through sociological analysis, using such concepts as Polanyi’s
double movement, which highlights the tendency to restrain growth in the face
of social disruption. The different outcomes in communication policy speak to
the stronger British tradition of restraining growth in the face of market
expansion, especially compared to the United States, where growth and
expansion have often been the central goal of policy. These differences can be
thought of as an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain
before it did in the United States. This speaks to fundamentally different
approaches to the regulation of markets in order to ease the tensions created in
society. The rise of markets and the capitalist ethic led to different attempts to
balance individual interests with the interests of the community, and these
understandings are reflected in the institutional structure of media.
At the same time, there are a number of noteworthy similarities in the
outcomes in U.S. and British broadcasting, and they can be tied to similar causes.
The similarities between the two countries were noted earlier, and it is these
basic similarities that help make the comparison possible. It is worth noting that
both countries were sufficiently equipped to develop radio broadcasting at about
the same time. Both countries created new systems of mass communication that
brought media content into people’s homes, changing the way people received
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and related to news, information and entertainment. Both countries elected to
issue licenses and create some sort of regulatory structure; neither seriously
considered a free market for spectrum or a complete government takeover. And,
over time, both countries have adopted a hybrid model of public and private
broadcasting, although the public media tradition remains far stronger in Britain.
Finally, both of these systems, rather than being structured with a great
deal of public input and consideration, were top-down systems, organized by
powerful actors and imposed upon the masses by administrative bodies. Neither
approach can hardly be considered democratic. This pattern is evident
throughout the history of communication. In The Master Switch, Columbia
University law professor Tim Wu, who coined the phrase “network neutrality,”
describes what he calls “the Cycle,” or the process that occurs as a new
communication technology becomes dominated by powerful actors. Simply put,
it goes from an open to a closed system:

History shows a typical progression of information technologies: from
somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry; from jury-rigged contraption
to slick production marvel; from a freely accessible channel to one strictly
controlled by a single corporation or cartel — from open to closed system.
It is a progression so common as to seem inevitable, though it would
hardly have seemed so at the dawn of any of the past century’s
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transformative technologies, whether telephony, radio, television, or
film.283

The development of broadcasting in both the United States and Britain seems to
represent this process of the closing of a system, but the closed systems that
resulted had very different aims.
“The brute force of monopoly” was the language used by John Reith of
the BBC to describe the manner by which the British broadcasting system came
to be; if there is to be competition, he said, it will be for “cheapness, not
goodness.”284 But Reith unapologetically resisted the democratization of
broadcasting and fought charges of elitism and paternalism by saying he was
justified in controlling the content of the media because he had benefited from
the education and cultural enlightenment that he thought everyone should be
able to access. The notion of “noblesse oblige” figures prominently in this
approach, as well as Reith’s determination not to turn a resource as valuable as
the airwaves over to commercial interests but rather to preserve the airwaves as
a system of continuing education. This represents a fundamentally positive
conception of liberty, which is used to justify government intervention in the
marketplace to serve the public interest.

283

TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 6 (2010).

284

Report of the Broadcasting Committee 1949, supra note 45, at 364.

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Communication Law and Policy, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2013. © Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com. DOI: 10.1080/10811680.2013.746136

The Closing of the Ether107
In America, the structure and regulation of broadcasting was more
heavily influenced by the rise of capitalism in the mid-1800s as it took hold of
American life; structures and institutions quickly emerged that made
commercialization the dominant approach to regulating society. Faith in the
democratic ideal encouraged the freedom of markets and a theoretically negative
conception of liberty that limited government’s ability to interfere in business. To
the contrary, however, government worked in many ways to structure society to
serve markets and justified this as a different type of public interest.
The British approach was far closer to what one would expect from a
reasonable normative understanding of the public interest, in the sense that it
serves the larger public good of improving the conditions of democracy and
freedom. As Mike Feintuck argued, the public interest from a normative
perspective can “be endowed with strong democratic credentials,” and “its
adoption as an interpretive principle, emphasizing the value of equality of
citizenship, within the legal and regulatory systems, is not only advisable, but
necessary, in the protection of democratic values.”285 The evidence explored in
this study suggests this type of normative definition was more fully embodied in
the British approach to broadcasting.
With regard to similarities and differences between U.S. and British
broadcasting, it is important not to overstate the impact of path-dependent
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processes and critical junctures in order to avoid an overly deterministic view. To
the contrary, path dependence and critical junctures can be used to highlight the
contingent nature of communication policy. The development of radio was at
least part historical accident in that no one could have been sure what the
technology would eventually become. It is for reasons like this that we must
remember to look forward from the past rather than backward from the present
when conducting historical analyses.
Future research should continue to explore institutional origins of
communication policy and structures, and scholars should continue to apply an
interdisciplinary approach, making use of such tools as path dependence,
historical comparison and sociological analysis. As Pierson notes, theoretical
work on sources of institutional origins and change in general “continue to be
sketchy at best,”286 so this is certainly an area of communication studies ripe for
further exploration. More specifically, future studies should pay careful attention
to the path-dependent processes of the early- and mid-1920s, as well as the
debates that took place during this period about the role of the state in regulating
communications in the United States. In general, future studies should continue
to explore the types of media structures and institutions best suited to enhance
democratic practices. There is a real need for increased discussion and evidence
related to whether and how media, properly insulated from government and
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commerce, can serve self-governing citizens better than market-based
alternatives. The lessons of the 1920s broadcast policy debates, especially when
viewed in a comparative context, still have much to teach us as we move forward
in the digital age and attempt to find a balance between public benefit and
private desire.
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